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摘要翻译：
本文的目的是提出一个交易费用的核心博弈论模型，指出直接费用如何决定损失的概率和随后的交易费用。证明了最优解的存在性，并证明了曝光对最优解位置的影响。将决策描述为一个两人博弈，讨论了交易费用分担规则如何决定交易费用的最优点是否与博弈均衡一致。本文还提出了一个行为者之间关于改变每一方支付的交易费用份额的博弈模型争端。定义了有效交易费用分担规则的要求，并假定存在一个不唯一的解。政策结论也是根据影响交易成本性质的制度设计原则设计的。
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英文标题：
《Transaction Costs: Economies of Scale, Optimum, Equilibrium and
Efficiency》
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作者：
L\'aszl\'o K\'allay, Tibor Tak\'acs, L\'aszl\'o Trautmann
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
The aim of this article is to propose a core game theory model of transaction costs wherein it is indicated how direct costs determine the probability of loss and subsequent transaction costs. The existence of optimum is proven, and the way in which exposure influences the location of the optimum is demonstrated. The decisions are described as a two-player game and it is discussed how the transaction cost sharing rule determines whether the optimum point of transaction costs is the same as the equilibrium of the game. A game modelling dispute between actors regarding changing the share of transaction costs to be paid by each party is also presented. Requirements of efficient transaction cost sharing rules are defined, and it is posited that a solution exists which is not unique. Policy conclusions are also devised based on principles of design of institutions to influence the nature of transaction costs.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2008.10348
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