求书 social choice and the mathematics of manipulation

求英文书 social choice and the mathematics of manipulation （2005）
author: Alan D. Taylor
Cambridge University Press

顶顶顶顶顶顶顶顶顶顶

是这本吧...........

again          ...................

这只是个目录啊，我也能找到这个

5# 逍遥女
粗看了一下，这应该是整本书（目录如下）：
Preface
PART ONE
1 AnIntroduction to Social Choice Theory 3
1.1 Some Intuitions, Terminology, and an Example 3
1.2 A Little History 9
1.3 Arrow’s Theorem 13
1.4 Twenty Voting Rules 20
1.5 Exercises 29
2 AnIntroduction to Manipulability 37
2.1 Set Preferences and Manipulability 37
2.2 Specific Examples of Manipulation 44
2.3 Summary of the Main Results 51
2.4 Agenda Manipulability and Transitive Rationality 53
2.5 Exercises 56
3 Resolute Voting Rules 60
3.1 The Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem 60
3.2 Ties in the Ballots 68
3.3 The Equivalence of Arrow’s Theorem and the
Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem 69
3.4 Reflections on the Proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite
Theorem 72
3.5 Exercises 77
PART TWO
4 Non-Resolute Voting Rules 81
4.1 The Duggan–Schwartz Theorem 81
4.2 Ties in the Ballots 87
4.3 Feldman’s Theorem 88
4.4 Expected Utility Results 95
5 Social Choice Functions 102
5.1 The Barber′a–Kelly Theorem 102
5.2 Ties in the Ballots 109
5.3 Another Barber′a Theorem 110
5.4 The MacIntyre–Pattanaik Theorem 113
6 Ultrafilters and the Infinite 118
6.1 The Infinite Version of Arrow’s Theorem 118
6.2 Infinite Gibbard–Satterthwaite without Invisible Dictators 122
6.3 Invisible Dictators Resurrected 123
6.4 Infinitely Many Voters and Infinitely Many
Alternatives 125
PART THREE
7 More on Resolute Procedures 133
7.1 Combinatorial Equivalents 133
7.2 Characterization Theorems for Resolute Voting Rules 136
7.3 Characterization Theorems for Resolute Social Choice
Functions 140
7.4 Characterizations for Resolute Social Welfare Functions 142
8 More on Non-Resolute Procedures 147
8.1 G¨ardenfors’ Theorem 147
8.2 Characterization Theorems for Non-Resolute Voting Rules 152
8.3 Another Feldman Theorem 154
8.4 Characterization Theorems for Non-Resolute Social
Choice Functions 157
9 Other Election-Theoretic Contexts 160
9.1 Introduction 160
9.2 Ballots That Are Sets: Approval Voting and
Quota Systems 160
9.3 The Barber′a–Sonnenschein–Zhou Theorem 163
9.4 Outcomes That Are Probabilistic Vectors:
Gibbard’s Theorem 164
References 167
Index 173


我无法再上传了，也不知道怎么把附件的100币取掉。要么给我你的EMAIL，我发给你。

非常感谢，不知道您是从哪里搞来的啊

逍遥女 发表于 2011-6-30 12:29
非常感谢，不知道您是从哪里搞来的啊

YOU ARE WELCOME. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF YOU MAY NEED SOMETHING ELSE.

好东西，就是有点大贵贵的

一只鱼 发表于 2011-6-30 22:12
好东西，就是有点大贵贵的

I CAN EMAIL IT TO YOU IF YOU WANT.