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人大企业经济学专业是经济学院2006年新设专业，是博士和硕士学位授予点。

企业经济学是近几十年来国际学术界最具活力、与企业管理实践联系最紧密的一个前沿性的研究领域。随着改革的深入，企业在我国社会经济生活中变得越来越重要。因此，从经济学的角度更理性地认识企业及企业间组织活动的规律，就成为一个非常重要的任务。本专业将主要在现代企业理论的架构下，跟踪国际学术发展的最前沿，力图将经济学与管理学有机结合，对企业组织制度的相关问题展开深入而系统的研究。与此同时，从企业理论还衍生出对其他组织和机制设计的研究，其中有关政治和ZF的组织制度对经济发展和社会福利影响的研究是一个世界性的备受关注的前沿问题。因此，这也是该专业教学和研究的一个重要内容。

本专业拥有一批高水平的年富力强的科研教学队伍，不断跟踪国际学术前沿，紧密结合中国企业的实践开展了大量卓有成效的研究，取了丰硕的具有国内领先水平的研究成果。在《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《世界经济》、《经济学（季刊）》等刊物上发表大量有影响的论文，且有越来越多的论文发表在国际期刊。此外，与中国人民大学出版合作，陆续出版了包括《企业理论丛书》和《企业理论译丛》等一系列专著和相关教材。这些研究成果获得了众多的省部级以上研究成果奖。同时，本专业教师长期承担大量的国家和省部级科研项目。为了更好地促进该专业的发展，经济学院还以该专业为基础成立了“中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心”，广泛地开展学术交流和科学研究。

人大企业经济学主文献，由杨其静教授、聂辉华副教授负责筛选编辑成册。

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关键词：企业经济学 企业经济 经济学 大企业 中国人民大学 企业管理 经济学 管理学 学术界 博士

综述性论文（Surveys）
1.        Holmstrom, B., and J. Tirole, 1989, “The Theory of the Firm”, in Handbook of Industrial Organization, R. Schmalesee and R. Willig (eds.), Amsterdam: North Holland.
2.        Pendergast, C., 1999, “The Provision of Incentives in Firms”, Journal of Economic Literature, 37: 7-63.
3.        Lazear, Edward P., and Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007, "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources", NBER Working Paper 13653
4.        Foss, Nicolai J., 1999,"The Theory of the Firm: An Introduction to Themes and Contributions", in Theories of the Firm: Critical Perspectives in Economic Organization, London: Routledge.
5.        Harris, M. and A. Raviv, 1991, “Theory of Capital Structure”, Journal of Finance, 46:255-87.
6.        Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, 1997, “A Survey of Corporate Governance”, Journal of Finance, 52: 737-87.
7.        Becht, Marco, P. Bolton, and A. Roell, 2002, "Corporate Governance and Control", NBER Working Paper No.9371.
8.        Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach,, 2003, "Boards of Directors and an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature", FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 2003(April): 7-26.
9.        Zingales, Luigi, 1997, "Corporate Governance", http://gsblgz.uchicago.edu, or 1998, the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, London: Macmillan, 497-502
10.        Teece, David J., Gary Pisano, Amy Shuen, 1997, "Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management", Strategic Management Journal, 18(7): 509-533
11.        Chiappori, P. and B. Salanie, 2003, “Testing Contract Theory: a Survey of Some Recent Work”, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress.

交易成本理论(Transaction Cost Economics)
12.        Coase, Ronald, 1937, “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica, 4: 386-405.
13.        Coase, Ronald, 1960, "The Problem of Social Cost", Journal of Law and Economics, 3: 1-44.
14.        Cheung, Steven, 1983, “The Contractual Nature of the Firm”, Journal of Law and Economics, 26: 1-21.
15.        Klein, B., R. Crawford and A. Alchian, 1978, “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process”, Journal of Law And Economics, 21: 297-326.
16.        Williamson, Oliver, 1979, “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations”, Journal of Law and Economics XXII, No. 2: 233-61.

Coase, Ronald, 1992, "The Institutional Structure of Production." A.E.R., vol. 82, no.4, 713-719（该文为Coase在Noble Prize颁奖典礼的演讲）
Williamson, O., 1971, "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations." A.E.R., vol.61, 112-123
Williamson, O., 1973, “Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary considerations,” A.E.R., vol.63, no.2, 316-325
Williamson, O., 1975, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Free press
Williamson, Oliver, 1996, The Mechanism of Governance. NY: Oxford University Press

团队生产 (Teamwork)
17.        Alchian, A. and Harold Demsetz, 1972, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,” A.E.R., 62: 777-795.
18.        Holmstrom, Bengt, 1982, “Moral Hazard in Teams”, Bell Journal of Economics, 13: 324-40.
19.        Lazear, E., and S. Rosen, 1981, “Rank-Order Tournament as Optimal Labor Contracts”, Journal of Political Economy, 89: 841-864.

委托代理理论(Agent Problem)
20.        Jensen, Michael and William Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360.
21.        Holmstrom, Bengt and P. Milgrom, 1991, “Multi-task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol.7, 24-52.
22.        Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, 1990, “Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts”, Econometrica, 58: 1279-1320.
23.        Hart, Oliver and J. Tirole, 1988, “Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics”, Review of Economic Studies, 55: 509-540.
24.        Holmstrom, B., and P. Milgrom, 1994, “The Firms as an Incentive System”, American Economic Review, 84(4): 927-91.

Grossman, Sanford J., and Hart, O., 1983,"An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometica, vol.51, 7-45
Harris, M. and Raviv, A., 1979,"Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information," J. Economic Theory, vol.20, 231-259
Holmstrom, B., 1982, “Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective,” In Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck. Helsinki: Swedish School of Economics. Republished in Review of Economic Studies, 1999, vol.66, 169-182
Holmstrom, B., 1979, “Moral Hazard and Observability,” Bell J. Economics, vol.10, no.1, 74-91
Radner, Roy, 1985, "Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting," Econometrica, vol.53, no.5, 1173-1198
Ross, Stephen A., 1973, “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem,” A.E.R., vol.63, no.2, 134-139
Spence, Michael, 1973, "Job Market Signaling," Q. J. E., vol., 355-373
Stightz, Joseph E, 1975, "Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes toward a Theory of Hierarchy," Bell J. Economics, vol.30, no.2, 552-579

不完全契约理论(The Approach of Incomplete Contract)
25.        Grossman, S. and Oliver Hart, 1986, “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration”, Journal of Political Economy, 94: 691-326.
26.        Hart, Oliver and John Moore, 1990, “Property Rights and Nature of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 98: 1119-58.

Tirole, Jean, 1999, “Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?” Econometrica, vol.67, no.4, 741-781

最优证券设计理论（Security Design）：融资与治理理论
27.        Aghion, P. and P. Bolton, 1992, “An ‘Incomplete Contracts’ Approach to Financial Contracting”, Review of Economic Studies, 59: 473-94.
28.        Dewatripont, M. and . J. Tirole, 1994, “A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-shareholder Congruence”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 1027-54.
29.        Hart, O. and J. Moore, 1994, “A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 841-79.
30.        Kaplan, Steven N., and Per Stromberg, 2003, "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, 70(2): 281-315

关系型合约理论（Relational Contracting Theory）
31.        Macaulay，Stewart，1963，“Non-Contractual Relations in Business： A Preliminary Study”，American Sociological Review， XXVIII：55-67.
32.        Baker，George，Robert Gibbons and Kevin Murphy，2002，“Relational Contracts and The Theory of the Firm”，Quarterly Journal of Economics，117：39-83.

科层结构(Hierarchy)
33.        Williamson, O., 1967, “Hierarchical Control and Optimal Size of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 75: 123-38.
34.                Calvo, G. and S. Wellisz, 1978, “Hierarchy, Ability, Income of Distribution”, Journal of Political Economy, 86: 943-952.
35.                Rosen, S., 1982, “Authority, control, and the distribution of earnings”, Bell Journal of Economics, 13: 311-323.
36.        Bolton, Patrick and Mathias Dewatripont, 1994, “The Firm as A Communication Network”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, CIX, No.4: 809-839.
37.        Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales, 2001, “The firm as a dedicated hierarchy: a theory of the origins and growth of firms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics，CXVI: 805-852.

合谋与组织设计(Collusion and Organizational Design)
38.        Crawford, Vincent and J. Sobel, 1982, “Strategic Information Transmission”, Econometrica, 50: 1431-1451.
39.        Tirole, Jean, 1986, “Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: on the Role of Collusion in Organization”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 181-213.
40.        Sah, R. K. and J. Stiglitz, 1988, “Committees, Hierarchies and Polyarchies”, The Economic Journal, 98: 451-470.
41.        Laffont J.-J. and D. Martimort, 1997, “Collusion Under Asymmetric Information”, Econometrica, 65: 875-911