Young's Workshop 2011秋季第一期

很好的学习平台

以我目前的水平，只能像看花似的看一下。。。

Topic：实证检验外部董事和CEO的社会关系对公司内部治理的影响。
样本： S&P 1500 companies, 2000-2007, Panel
结论：1）More powerful CEOs are more likely to appoint grey directors.
2） Network ties weaken the intensity of board monitoring.
3） Network ties undermine the effectiveness of internal governance.
贡献：全面考察了灰色董事的各种影响，尤其是监督行为。很好地处理了内生性 。
不足：没有考虑灰色董事的建议和信息沟通的功能，没有考虑灰色董事对中小股东的保护作用。

学习学习
要常搞这样的活动啊

谢谢。支持这样的研究，我是研究社会资本与企业战略管理，我想这样的研究有助于我对企业的进一步理解。

好人真多啊

认真的找找文献,好好看的话还是很有帮助的

一篇相似的文献：Bang Nguyen, Kasper Nielsen. The value of independent directors: Evidence from sudden deaths. JFE. 2010.

作者很好的梳理了死亡事件做外生事件研究的有关文献，并严格定义和筛选了突然死亡和未预期到的死亡——279个样本。

对董事、董事会、公司三个层面的数据进行了描述统计，然后对死亡进行事件研究，然后计量证实独立董事死亡事件的超额收益是归因于独立董事的独立身份而不是其他。

文章的主要贡献：直接证实了独立董事对股东价值的作用；很好地处理了董事会构成的内生性问题。

关于死亡事件的有文献：
In terms of methodology, we rely on an existing literature using sudden deaths as identification strategy. In a seminal study, Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan, and Newman (1985) use sudden deaths of executives toestimate the value of their continued employment. Using a sample of 53 executives’ sudden deaths between 1971 and 1982, they find positive stock price reaction to the death of founder-CEOs and negative reaction to that of professional CEOs. The attractiveness of this approach is that sudden, unexpected deaths occur randomly and are exogenous to current firm and market conditions. In later studies this approach has been used to examine interaction between characteristics of executives and the stock price reaction to sudden death announcements. Worrell, Davidson, Chandy, and Garrison (1986), analyzing the market reaction to 127 announcements of executive deaths, show negative reaction to the deaths of CEOs and positive to that of chairmen. Slovin and Sushka (1993) find positive stock price reactions to the death of 85 inside blockholders. Hayes and Schaefer (1999) find positive reaction to 29 sudden deaths of CEOs, and they compare this to the negative stock reaction when managers are raided. They attribute this difference in stock reactions to differences in ability, because raided managers are likely to have high ability, whereas suddenly deceased CEOs possess average ability. Borokhovich, Brunarski, Donahue, and Harman(2006) use a sample of 161 executive deaths and show that stock price reactions to sudden executive death is related to board characteristics. Salas (2010) examines 184 sudden deaths and shows that stock price reactions are positive for entrenched CEOs. Finally, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2007) study the event of the deaths of CEOs and of their relatives and show that CEOs are instrumental for corporate performance.

A growing body of literature has also used sudden death to identify the value of political connections. Roberts (1990) examines the stock reaction to the announcement of the sudden death of a US senator for firms that made contributions to his campaign and finds that firm value decreases, especially for those from his constituency. Fisman (2001), who studies the market reaction for Indonesian firms connected to President Suharto when rumors of his declining health were circulating in the media, shows that the negative reaction is closely related to the level of connection. Faccio and Parsley (2009) develop this approach further by identifying sudden deaths of 192 politicians from 35 countries and show that political ties are valuable to firms. Subsequent to the sudden death, stock prices fall, followed by a drop in the rate of growth rates and access to credit.

好东西啊。我全下了。回头好好研究一下————受益匪浅！支持支持！！！

学术味很浓啊