内容介绍如下：
Part 1. Some Topics in The Theory of Human Capital 3
Chapter 1. The Basic Theory of Human Capital 5
1. General Issues 5
2. Uses of Human Capital 7
3. Sources of Human Capital Differences 9
4. A Simple Two-Period Model of Schooling Investments and
Some Evidence 12
5. Evidence on Human Capital Investments and Credit
Constraints 15
6. The Ben-Porath Model 20
7. Selection and Wages–The One-Factor Model 23
Chapter 2. The Signaling Approach to Human Capital 29
1. The Basic Story 29
2. Evidence on Labor Market Signaling 36
Chapter 3. Human Capital Externalities 39
1. Theory 39
2. Evidence 44
Chapter 4. School Quality and Peer Group Effects 49
1. School Quality 49
2. Peer Group Effects 51
Part 2. Incentives, Agency Theory and Efficiency Wages 65
Chapter 5. Moral Hazard: Basic Models 67
1. The Baseline Model of Incentive-Insurance Trade off 68
2. Incentives without Asymmetric Information 71
3. Incentives-Insurance Trade-off 73
4. The Form of Performance Contracts 78
5. The Use of Information: Sufficient Statistics 80
Chapter 6. Moral Hazard: Further Topics 83
1. Limited Liability 83
iii
iv CONTENTS
2. Linear Contracts 87
3. Evidence 92
Chapter 7. Multiple Tasks-Multiple Agents 95
1. Multitasking 95
2. Relative Performance Evaluation 99
3. Tournaments 100
4. Application: CEO Pay 107
Chapter 8. Career Concerns 111
1. The Basic Model of Career Concerns 111
2. Multi-period model 119
3. Career Concerns and Multitasking: Application to Teaching120
Chapter 9. Efficiency Wage Models 137
1. The Shapiro-Stiglitz Model 137
2. Other Solutions to Incentive Problems 144
3. Evidence on Efficiency Wages 145
4. Efficiency Wages, Monitoring and Corporate Structure 148
Chapter 10. Holdups and Investments 159
1. Investments in the Absence of Binding Contracts 159
2. Incomplete Contracts and The Internal Organization of the
Firm 163
Part 3. Investment in Skills 167
Chapter 11. The Theory of Training Investments 169
1. General Vs. Specific Training 169
2. The Becker Model of Training 171
3. Market Failures Due to Contractual Problems 174
Chapter 12. Training in Imperfect Labor Markets 177
1. Basic Ideas 177
2. General Equilibrium 186
Chapter 13. Firm-Specific Skills 197
1. The Evidence On Firm-Specific Rents and Interpretation 197
2. Investment in Firm-Specific Skills 203
Part 4. Search and Unemployment 215
Chapter 14. Unemployment 217
1. Introduction 217
2. Some Basic Facts About Unemployment 218
CONTENTS v
Chapter 15. Search Approach to Unemployment 221
1. The Basic Search Model 221
2. Efficiency of Search Equilibrium 235
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