3334.rar
(76.19 KB)
本附件包括：
价格不仅受到信息和预期的影响，而且也受到噪音交易者的影响，作者通过股价的非线性变化检验了这一思想
3335.rar
(71.52 KB)
本附件包括：
Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds Paul G. Mahoney University of Virginia School of Law 580 Massie Road Charlottesville, VA 22903 Phone: 434-924-3996 e-mail: pmahoney@virginia.edu Second draft: February 9, 2004
Mutual funds present a paradox. They give unsophisticated investors the benefit of diversification and professional money management. But how can the unsophisticated know whether they are paying a reasonable price for those services? A premise of current mutual fund regulation is that the market should set fees, but those fees should be transparent. In the mutual fund scandals of 2003, mutual fund managers secretly obtained extra compensation by selling the right to trade at stale prices. The appropriate policy response turns on the answers to contested questions. Was the improper trading a result of insufficient regulatory and corporate governance controls on mutual fund managers? Alternatively, was it the result of overly intrusive regulatory
limits on fee structures that made it more difficult to align the interests of fund managers and investors and deter excessive trading? Did the extra returns earned by favored investors who traded at stale prices come mostly out of the profits of long-term investors, or did reductions in demand for the affected funds shift a substantial part of the loss back to the mutual fund managers? These are useful starting points for future research.
发帖
雷达卡
jg-xs1
京公网安备 11010802022788号
论坛法律顾问：王进律师
知识产权保护声明
免责及隐私声明
