楼主: dannin
14282 25

[基础问答] [下载]Salanie 的《契约经济学》(The Economics of Contracts)(MIT,2005) [推广有奖]

  • 2关注
  • 17粉丝

VIP

澹宁居士

已卖:12848份资源

教授

57%

还不是VIP/贵宾

-

威望
0
论坛币
398890 个
通用积分
14.4181
学术水平
7 点
热心指数
14 点
信用等级
7 点
经验
22327 点
帖子
363
精华
1
在线时间
2050 小时
注册时间
2006-6-28
最后登录
2025-10-7

楼主
dannin 发表于 2007-9-10 12:10:00 |AI写论文

+2 论坛币
k人 参与回答

经管之家送您一份

应届毕业生专属福利!

求职就业群
赵安豆老师微信:zhaoandou666

经管之家联合CDA

送您一个全额奖学金名额~ !

感谢您参与论坛问题回答

经管之家送您两个论坛币!

+2 论坛币

一本学习契约理论的好书,尤其适合初学者,特此推荐。

这里提供的是扫描版。

content

The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition


Foreword to the Second Edition
Sample Chapter - Download PDF (22 KB)
ix
Foreword to the First Edition
Sample Chapter - Download PDF (31 KB)
xi
1. Introduction
Sample Chapter - Download PDF (48 KB)
1
2. Adverse Selection: General Theory 11
3. Adverse Selection: Examples and Extensions 43
4. Signaling Models 97
5. Moral Hazard 119
6. The Dynamics of Complete Contracts 161
7. Incomplete Contracts 193
8. Some Empirical Work 211
Appendix: Some Noncooperative Game Theory 223
Name Index
Sample Chapter - Download PDF (20 KB)
233
Subject Index
Sample Chapter - Download PDF (45 KB)
235

152727.pdf (6.13 MB, 需要: 20 个论坛币)


[此贴子已经被作者于2007-9-10 12:14:00编辑过]

二维码

扫码加我 拉你入群

请注明:姓名-公司-职位

以便审核进群资格,未注明则拒绝

关键词:Economics Contracts contract Economic Salanie 经济学 Economics The MIT 契约

本帖被以下文库推荐

独立之精神,自由之思想。

沙发
mygenic(未真实交易用户) 发表于 2007-9-10 12:17:00

require so much money

藤椅
microeco(真实交易用户) 发表于 2007-10-14 19:34:00

Publisher:   The MIT Press
Number Of Pages:   232
Publication Date:   1997-03-15
Sales Rank:   847049
ISBN / ASIN:   0262193868
EAN:   9780262193863
Binding:   Hardcover
Manufacturer:   The MIT Press
Studio:   The MIT Press


Although it is one of the major achievements in the history of economic thought, the general equilibrium model is not completely satisfactory as a descriptive tool. In the 1970s several economists settled on a new way to study economic relationships that is often called the "economics of information." The theory of contracts is one of its main building blocks.

The theory of contracts uses partial equilibrium models that take into account the full complexity of strategic interactions between privately informed agents in well-defined institutional settings. The models sum up the constraints imposed by the prevailing institutional setting through a contract, either explicit or implicit. They make intensive use of noncooperative game theory with asymmetric information.

The Economics of Contracts introduces graduate students and nonspecialist professional economists to the theory of contracts. It grew out of a course Professor Salanié gave to third-year Stanford graduate students and third-year students at the Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Economique. The book focuses on the methods used to analyze the models, but also discusses a few of the many applications the theory has generated in various fields of economics. The author's goal is to give readers the basic tools to create their own applications.

 

Review:

Broad introduction with a lack of depth

...so if that's what you want, then this book is for you. However, if you're using this for your first look at contract theory, you may well be disappointed (as I am). I don't credit Salanie for leaving out the technical details of the models, because he doesn't effectively convey the depth of the models in his largely intuitive treatment. I'm all for intuition and simplicity, but his book leaves me with more questions than answers after reading it.

I'm browsing around on Amazon for a better book, so I thought I'd write a quick rating so that other lowly beginners like me don't make the same mistake I made in purchasing this as my only textbook.

On the other hand, I suppose if you want a concise overview with the sketch of most of the important contract theory models, then this might be what you're looking for.

 

Review:

well chosen topics, poorly written

The topics and papers discussed in this book are great, in that sense, it's a good book. However, the book is very poorly written.

The author tries to avoid mathematical details of the models but such attempt makes the book not well concatenated. For seriously readers, you learn a lot more by reading the papers cited in this book than reading the book itself.

 

Review:

A good book (with some minor problems)

Salanie's book covers the standard areas of contract theory; adverse selection, moral hazard, signalling etc, along with chapters on the dynamics of complete contracts, incomplete contracts and a final chapter on the empirical work on contracts. The material on dynamics and incomplete contracts is most welcome as many other books in this area do not cover it. Perhaps more space could have been given over to incomplete contracts given the increasing importance of them.

The book manages to cover a large amount of material in a relatively small number of pages, it is just over 200 pages. Most of this material is presented in an accessible and readable manner and most graduate students in economics should be able to read the book.

The most obvious problem with the book is the number of small errors it contains. Some of the figures have points that are in the wrong place; there are a number of what look like typos in the text, being told that an indifference curve goes through a point (q2,t2) when in fact it goes through (q1,t1) for example. While these are only minor problems they do distract from the otherwise good impression that the book makes.

板凳
wlilidxc(真实交易用户) 发表于 2008-4-7 07:01:00
Got it! Thx!

报纸
山风(真实交易用户) 发表于 2008-7-7 06:59:00
这本书非常适应中级程度的人学习,能不能免费啊

地板
chhg_2001(未真实交易用户) 发表于 2008-12-1 13:22:00
有便宜的帖子

7
55079044(未真实交易用户) 发表于 2008-12-27 09:23:00

怎么这书就没有中文版的吗 ? 哪个好心人有点 话 发给我吧 谢谢了 找了很久了  都没有make6223657@hotmail.com

8
sunlg74(未真实交易用户) 发表于 2008-12-29 14:35:00

中文版已经出版

 丛书名: 汉译经济学文库
作  者: (法)萨拉尼耶 著;费力域张肖虎郑育家
出 版 社:
  • 出版时间: 2008-7-1
  • 字  数: 199000
  • 版  次: 1
  • 页  数: 142
  • 印刷时间: 2008/07/01
  • 开  本: 16开
  • 印  次: 1
  • 纸  张: 胶版纸
  • I S B N : 9787564201722
  • 包  装: 平装

内容简介

合同理论是过去30年中发展最快的经济学领域之一,也是经济学家们在认识到标准的完美竞争的市场理论面对现实环境时却并不完美的现实后的一个反应。它从不确定性、不完美信息、交易的时间维度以及合同的执行能力等多个方面拓展了传统的经济学对交易的描述。合同理论的许多内容与通常被冠以其他名称的经济学理论的内容相重合,如信息经济学、委托代理理论、激励理论等。这并不奇怪。事实上,经济学中关于这些理论并没有法定统一的名称,毕竟这些理论只是对许多个不同的相关研究的汇总之后所整理出来的体系。从涉及的范围来看,合同理论的外延似乎更广一些。它并非只研究信息问题,也并非只讨论单一的委托代理关系,它从信息、承诺、机制设计及合同的履行等多个方面讨论了与合同有关的各种问题。
   本书是关于研究“合同经济学”的专著,书中具体包括了:在逆向选择模型上的应用、激励约束分析、风险回避的代理人、稳健性和观察误差、无成本信号、最优合同的性质、什么是完全合同、有限重复道德风险、合同不完全与投资不足等内容。

目录

合同理论的范式演进——译者序
前言
1 引言
1.1 模型的分类
1.2 委托-代理模型
1.3 全书概要
参考文献
2 逆向选择:一般理论
2.1 机制设计
2.1.1 一般机制
2.1.2 在逆向选择模型上的应用
2.2 离散的价格歧视模型
2.2.1 消费者
2.2.2 销售者
2.2.3 社会最优:完美歧视
2.2.4 不完美信息
2.3 标准模型
2.3.1 激励约束分析
2.3.2 模型求解
习题
参考文献
3 逆向选择:实例及拓展
3.1 应用举例
3.1.1 企业规制
3.1.2 最优征税
3.1.3 垄断保险商
3.1.4 隐性合同
3.2 拓展
3.2.1 合同中的竞争
3.2.2 拍卖理论
3.2.3 风险回避的代理人
3.2.4 多维特征
3.2.5 稳健性和观察误差
3.2.6 双边私人信息
3.2.7 抵消性激励
习题
参考文献
4 信号模型
4.1 二手车市场
4.2 有成本信号
4.2.1 分离均衡
4.2.2 混同均衡
4.2.3 均衡的选择
4.3 无成本信号
4.3.1 一个简单的例子
4.3.2 一般模型
4.4 其他例子
4.5 有信息的委托人
习题
参考文献
5 道德风险
5.1 一个简单的例子
5.2 标准模型
5.2.1 代理人的规划
5.2.2 委托人的规划
5.2.3 最优合同的性质
5.3 拓展
5.3.1 信息性和次优损失
5.3.2 行动的连续统
5.3.3 结果的无限性
5.3.4 多信号情形
5.3.5 多代理人模型
5.3.6 合同的稳健性
5.3.7 多任务模型
5.4 应用举例
5.4.1 保险
5.4.2 工资的确定
习题
参考文献
6 动态完全合同
6.1 承诺与再谈判
6.2 策睁性承诺
6.3 什么是完全合同
6.4 逆向选择
6.4.1 充分承诺
6.4.2 长期承诺
6.4.3 无承诺
6.4.4 短期承诺
6.4.5 结论
6.5 道德风险
6.5.1 努力后再谈判
6.5.2 收敛于社会最优
6.5.3 有限重复道德风险
参考文献
7 不完全合同
7.1 可观察但不可证实的努力
7.2 产权与剩余控制权
7.3 合同不完全与投资不足
7.4 结束语
参考文献
8 经验研究
8.1 逆向选择模型
8.1.1 标准模型
8.1.2 拍卖模型
8.2 道德风险模型
8.2.1 运用动态模型
8.2.2 运用保险数据
8.3 结论
参考文献
附录:非合作博弈理论
A.1 完美信息博弈
A.1.1 纳什均衡
A.1.2 子博弈精炼均衡
A.2 不完全信息博弈
A.2.1 贝叶斯均衡
A.2.2 完美贝叶斯均衡
A.2.3 完美贝叶斯均衡的再精炼
参考文献
术语对照表

9
朵朵儿(未真实交易用户) 发表于 2009-7-9 12:47:45
So expencisive!

10
ttuching(真实交易用户) 发表于 2009-11-18 02:52:50
下載內容和Demo內容在質量上有差

您需要登录后才可以回帖 登录 | 我要注册

本版微信群
扫码
拉您进交流群
GMT+8, 2026-1-16 17:23