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英文文献：The Dirty Faces Game Revisited-脏脸游戏再次上演
英文文献作者：Ralph-C. Bayer,Mickey Chan
英文文献摘要：
Weber (2001) uses the Dirty Faces Game to examine the depth of iterated rationality. Weber does not consider equilibria that contain weakly dominated actions. So he implicitly assumes that it is common knowledge that no one ever uses weakly dominated actions. We show that allowing for equilibria in weakly dominated strategies greatly extents the set of potentially rational actions. The original game therefore lacks discriminatory power, as many actions categorised as irrational by Weber can actually be part of an equilibrium strategy. We slightly modify the payoff structure and establish strict dominance, which leads to a unique equilibrium. The resulting dominance-solvable game is implemented in an experiment. We find that subjects are either able to iterate right to the equilibrium or fail to do so when two or more steps of iteration are necessary. Virtually all subjects were able to do one step of iteration. Further, we find evidence that the lack of confidence in other players' iterative abilities induces deviations from equilibrium play.
韦伯(2001)用脏脸游戏来考察重复理性的深度。韦伯不考虑包含弱支配行为的均衡。所以他含蓄地假设，没有人使用过弱支配的行为，这是常识。我们表明，允许弱支配策略中的均衡极大地扩展了潜在理性行为的集合。因此，最初的博弈缺乏歧视性的力量，因为许多被韦伯归类为非理性的行为实际上可以成为均衡策略的一部分。我们对支付结构进行了轻微的修改，建立了严格的优势，从而形成了一种独特的均衡。在实验中实现了所得到的优势可解博弈。我们发现，当需要进行两步或更多的迭代时，主体要么能够直接迭代到平衡状态，要么不能这样做。几乎所有的实验对象都能够完成迭代的一步。此外，我们发现证据表明，对其他玩家的迭代能力缺乏信心导致了对均衡游戏的偏离。
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