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英文文献：Lobby Interaction and Trade Policy-游说互动和贸易政策
英文文献作者：Tatyana Chesnokova
英文文献摘要：
The paper introduces lobby interaction in the ''protection for sale'' framework. Special interest groups provide unconditional contributions where the marginal contribution of a lobby is decreasing in the total sum collected by the government. In contrast to the ''protection for sale'' model, for a given proportion of capital owners in the organized sectors, an increase in the number of lobbies has an impact on trade policy. It is also shown that an increase in the number of lobbies has two opposite effects on each lobby's contribution: a competition effect which lowers a lobby's contribution and a political influence effect which tends to increase its contribution.
本文介绍了“出售保护”框架下的游说互动。特殊利益集团提供无条件捐款，当游说团体的边际捐款在政府收集的总额中减少时。与“出售保护”模式相反，对于有组织部门中一定比例的资本所有者来说，游说团体数量的增加会对贸易政策产生影响。研究还发现，游说团数目的增加会对每个游说团的贡献产生两种相反的影响:竞争效应会降低游说团的贡献，而政治影响效应会增加其贡献。
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