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英文文献：Asymmetric Multiple-Object First-Price Auctions
英文文献作者：Paul Pezanis-Christou
英文文献摘要：
The paper reports on the effects of one-sided imperfect information on bidding behaviour in simultaneous and sequential first-price auctions of non-identical objects when bidders have multi-unit demands. The analysis provides the following four main results. First, when different objects are to be sold in sequence, the seller maximises her expected revenues by selling the most valuable object first. Second, the more the objects are different and the more the sequential format favours the informed bidder. Third, by switching the order of sales, the seller may want to change her initial preference for a simultaneous format (in which bidders submit object-specific bids) to one for a sequential format. Fourth, sequential auctions are mostly preferred by the seller when the objects are likely to be of low value and the precision of the informed bidder's signal is low.
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