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英文文献：A non-game-theoretic approach to bidding in first-price and all-pay auctions-在首价拍卖和全付拍卖中的非博弈论方法
英文文献作者：Paul Pezanis-Christou,Hang Wu
英文文献摘要：
We propose a novel approach to the modelling of behavior in first-price and all-pay auctions that builds on the presumption that bidders do not engage in game-theoretic reasoning. Our models, AsP (for Aspired-Payoff) and nIBE (for na??ve Impulse Balance Equilibrium), exploit the information available to bidders and assume risk neutrality, no best-responding behavior and no profit-maximization. Their parameter-free variants entail either overbidding or Nash equilibrium bidding. We assess their explanatory power with the data of first-price and all-pay auction experiments and find that overall, our models outperform Nash in explaining the data on either format. Assuming probability misperception further improves their goodness-of-fit. Assuming impulse weighting in nIBE may lead to overbidding and organizes the effect of end-of-round information feedback on behavior in repeated auctions.
我们提出了一种新颖的方法，以建立在竞价者不参与博弈论推理的假设上，来模拟首价和全付拍卖的行为。我们的模型，AsP(追求回报)和nIBE (naA?ve脉冲平衡均衡)，利用投标者可获得的信息，并假定风险中性、无最佳响应行为和无利润最大化。它们的无参数变量要么是过高出价，要么是纳什均衡出价。我们用首价和全付拍卖实验的数据来评估它们的解释能力，并发现总体而言，我们的模型在解释数据方面都优于纳什。假设概率错觉进一步提高了他们的配适度。假设nIBE中的脉冲加权可能导致出价过高，并组织轮末信息反馈对重复拍卖行为的影响。
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