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英文文献：Why Macroeconomic coordination may not be possible in a Monetary Union?-为什么宏观经济协调在一个货币联盟中可能不可能?
英文文献作者：George D. Demopoulos,Nicholas A. Yannacopoulos
英文文献摘要：
Macroeconomic policy coordination in a monetary union seems to work, when it is in the self-interest of the individual countries to do (individual rationality) what is also good for the currency area as a whole (group rationality). We explore the possibility of co- ordination, first in the context of the conventional theory using a two country model opera- ting in decentralized framework. We find that coordination of macroeconomic policies fails, because of the revealed preference of the creditor countries to hoard their surpluses. We then explore the same problem in a cooperative framework, modeling the monetary union as an n-person cooperative game. This game does not possess a core and therefore any agreement by the set of all concerned countries to coordinate macroeconomic policies can be challenged by any subcoalition. Failure to coordinate macroeconomic policies in a monetary union means that the process of adjustment is asymmetric rather than symmetric (the cost of adjustment is enti- rely born by the debtor countries), a fact that renders its survival problematic.
一个货币联盟中的宏观经济政策协调似乎是有效的，当做对整个货币区有利的事情(个人理性)符合单个国家的自身利益时(个人理性)。我们首先在传统理论的背景下，在分散式的框架下，采用了两国模式的戏班模式，探讨了合作的可能性。我们发现，由于债权国明显倾向于囤积其盈余，宏观经济政策协调失败。然后，我们在一个合作框架中探讨相同的问题，将货币联盟建模为一个n人合作博弈。这一博弈没有核心，因此任何由所有相关国家达成的协调宏观经济政策的协议都可能受到任何次级联盟的挑战。一个货币联盟未能协调宏观经济政策，意味着调整过程是不对称的，而非对称的(调整的成本是由债务国承担的)，这一事实使其存在问题。
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