作者:Ron Lavi
出版社:Springer
页数:307
出版时间:Springer; 2014 edition (December 22, 2014)
语言:English
格式:pdf
内容简介:
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2014, held in Haifa, Israel, in October 2014. The 24 full papers and 5 short papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 65 submissions. They cover various important aspects of algorithmic game theory, such as matching theory, game dynamics, games of coordination, networks and social choice, markets and auctions, price of anarchy, computational aspects of games, mechanism design and auctions.
Table of Content
Front Matter Pages -
Matching Theory
Social Welfare in One-Sided Matchings:Random Priority and Beyond Pages 1-12
Efficiency of Truthful and SymmetricMechanisms in One-Sided Matching Pages13-24
Stable Marriage with GeneralPreferences Pages 25-36
Game Dynamics
The Convergence Time for Selfish BinPacking Pages 37-48
Short Sequences of Improvement Moves Leadto Approximate Equilibria in Constraint Satisfaction Games Pages 49-60
Paths to Stable Allocations Pages 61-73
Self-stabilizing Uncoupled Dynamics Pages 74-85
Games of Coordination
Profit Sharing with Thresholds andNon-monotone Player Utilities Pages86-97
Shared Resource Management via RewardSchemes Pages 98-109
Budget-Restricted Utility Games withOrdered Strategic Decisions Pages110-121
Networks/Social Choice
Influence Maximization inSwitching-Selection Threshold Models Pages 122-133
Network Cost-Sharing without Anonymity Pages 134-145
Recognizing 1-Euclidean Preferences: AnAlternative Approach Pages 146-157
Markets and Auctions
Clearing Markets via Bundles Pages 158-169
Walrasian Equilibrium with Few Buyers Pages 170-181
Multimarket Oligopolies with RestrictedMarket Access Pages 182-193
Value of Targeting Pages 194-205
Price of Anarchy
Welfare Guarantees for ProportionalAllocations Pages 206-217
Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games andCoalitional Dynamics Pages 218-230
Computational Aspects of Games
The Complexity of Approximating a TremblingHand Perfect Equilibrium of a Multi-player Game in Strategic Form Pages 231-243
Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibriain Symmetric Bimatrix Games Pages244-254
Mechanism Design and Auctions
Mechanisms for Hiring a Matroid Basewithout Money Pages 255-266
Prediction and Welfare in Ad Auctions Pages 267-278
On the Impossibility of Black-BoxTransformations in Mechanism Design Pages 279-290
Back Matter Pages -
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