Foreign Aid and Governance in Africa-对外援助与非洲治理

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英文文献：Foreign Aid and Governance in Africa-对外援助与非洲治理
英文文献作者：Simplice Asongu,Jacinta C. Nwachukwu
英文文献摘要：
Purpose – This paper investigates the effect of foreign aid on governance in order to extend the debates on foreign aid and to verify common positions from Moyo’s ‘Dead Aid’, Collier’s ‘Bottom Billion’ and Eubank’s ‘Somaliland’. The empirical evidence is based on updated data from 52 African countries for the period 1996-2010. Design/methodology/approach – An endogeneity robust instrumental variable Two-Stage-Least Squares empirical strategy is employed. Findings – The findings reveal that development assistance deteriorates economic (regulation quality and government effectiveness) and institutional (corruption-control and rule of law) governance, but has an insignificant effect on political (political stability, voice and accountability) governance. While, these findings are broadly in accordance with Moyo (2009) and Collier (2007) on weak governance, they neither confirm the Eubank (2012) position on political governance nor the Asongu (2012) stance on the aid-corruption nexus in his debate with Okada & Samreth (2012). Practical implications – The use of foreign aid as an instrument to influence the election and replacement of political leaders in Africa may have insignificant results. It is time to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid and that economists and policy makers start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is used to influence economic, institutional and political governance in recipient countries. Originality/value – The paper extends the debate on foreign aid and institutions in Africa in the light a plethora of recent studies in the aid literature.

目的-本文探讨外援对治理的影响，以扩大关于外援的争论，并验证Moyo的“死亡援助”、Collier的“底层十亿人”和Eubank的“索马里兰”的共同立场。经验证据是根据1996-2010年期间52个非洲国家的最新数据得出的。设计/方法/方法-采用内生性稳健工具变量两阶段最小二乘经验策略。调查结果——调查结果显示，发展援助会恶化经济(监管质量和政府效率)和体制(腐败控制和法治)治理，但对政治(政治稳定、话语权和问责制)治理没有显著影响。尽管这些发现与Moyo(2009)和Collier(2007)关于弱治理的观点大体一致，但它们既没有证实Eubank(2012)在政治治理方面的立场，也没有证实Asongu(2012)在与Okada和Samreth(2012)的辩论中关于援助-腐败关系的立场。实际影响——利用外援作为影响非洲政治领导人选举和更替的工具，可能会产生不显著的结果。现在是解决外援的第二个悲剧的时候了，经济学家和政策制定者开始重新思考利用外援影响受援国经济、制度和政治治理的模型和理论。原创性/价值——鉴于最近援助文献中过多的研究，本文扩展了关于外国援助和非洲机构的辩论。

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