| Series Foreword | |
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| Preface | |
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| Introduction | |
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| | 1 | "Modeling" and "Bounded Rationality" | |
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| | 2 | The Aim of This Book | |
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| | 3 | The State of the Art | |
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| | 4 | A Personal Note | |
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| | 5 | Bibliographic Notes | |
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1 | Bounded Rationality in Choice | |
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| | 1.1 | The "Rational Man" | |
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| | 1.2 | The Traditional Economist's Position | |
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| | 1.3 | The Attack on the Traditional Approach | |
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| | 1.4 | Experimental Evidence | |
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| | 1.5 | Comments | |
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| | 1.6 | Bibliographic Notes | |
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| | 1.7 | Projects | |
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2 | Modeling Procedural Decision Making | |
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| | 2.1 | Motivation | |
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| | 2.2 | Preparing the Tools: Similarity Relations | |
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| | 2.3 | A Procedure of Choice between Vectors | |
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| | 2.4 | Analysis | |
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| | 2.5 | Case-Based Theory | |
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| | 2.6 | Bibliographic Notes | |
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| | 2.7 | Projects | |
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3 | Modeling Knowledge | |
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| | 3.1 | Knowledge and Bounded Rationality | |
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| | 3.2 | Information Structure | |
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| | 3.3 | The Set-Theoretical Definition of Knowledge | |
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| | 3.4 | Kripke's Model | |
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| | 3.5 | The Impact Of The Timing Of Decisions And Having More Information | |
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| | 3.6 | On The Possibility Of Speculative Trade | |
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| | 3.7 | Bibliographic Notes | |
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| | 3.8 | Projects | |
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4 | Modeling Limited Memory | |
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| | 4.1 | Imperfect Recall | |
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| | 4.2 | An Extensive Decision Making Model With Imperfect Information | |
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| | 4.3 | Perfect And Imperfect Recall | |
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| | 4.4 | Time Consistency | |
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| | 4.5 | The Role Of Randomization | |
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| | 4.6 | The Multiselves Approaches | |
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| | 4.7 | On The Problematics Of Using The Model | |
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| | 4.8 | Bibliographic Notes | |
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| | 4.9 | Projects | |
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5 | Choosing What to Know | |
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| | 5.1 | Optimal Information Structures | |
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| | 5.2 | What Is "High" And What Is "Low"? | |
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| | 5.3 | Manipulating Informational Restrictions | |
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| | 5.4 | Perceptrons | |
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| | 5.5 | Bibliographic Notes | |
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| | 5.6 | Projects | |
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6 | Modeling Complexity In Group Decisions | |
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| | 6.1 | Introduction | |
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| | 6.2 | The Model Of A Team | |
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| | 6.3 | Processing Information | |
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| | 6.4 | Aggregating Preferences | |
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| | 6.5 | Bibliographic Notes | |
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| | 6.6 | Projects | |
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7 | Modeling Bounded Rationality in Games | |
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| | 7.1 | Introduction | |
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| | 7.2 | Interactions Between Luce Players | |
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| | 7.3 | A Game With Procedurally Rational Players | |
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| | 7.4 | Limited Foresight In Extensive Games | |
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| | 7.5 | Bibliographic Notes | |
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| | 7.6 | Projects | |
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8 | Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games | |
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| | 8.1 | Introduction | |
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| | 8.2 | The Model Of The Repeated Game: A Brief Review | |
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| | 8.3 | Strategies As Machines In Infinitely Repeated Games | |
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| | 8.4 | Complexity Considerations In Repeated Games | |
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| | 8.5 | The Structure Of Machine Game Equilibria | |
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| | 8.6 | Repeated Extensive Games | |
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| | 8.7 | Concluding Remarks | |
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| | 8.8 | Bibliographic Notes | |
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| | 8.9 | Projects | |
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9 | Attempts to Resolve the Finite Horizon Paradoxes | |
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| | 9.1 | Motivation | |
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| | 9.2 | Implementation Of Strategies By Machines | |
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| | 9.3 | Counting Is Costly | |
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| | 9.4 | Bounded Capability To Count | |
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| | 9.5 | Machines Also Send Messages | |
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| | 9.6 | The e-Equilibrium Approach: A Deviation Is Costly | |
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| | 9.7 | Conclusion | |
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| | 9.8 | Bibliographic Notes | |
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| | 9.9 | Projects | |
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10 | Computability Constraints in Games | |
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| | 10.1 | Introduction | |
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| | 10.2 | Informal Results On Computability | |
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| | 10.3 | Is There A "Rational Player"? | |
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| | 10.4 | Turing Machine Game | |
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| | 10.5 | Bibliographic Notes | |
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| | 10.6 | Projects | |
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11 | Final Thoughts | |
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| | 11.1 | Simon's Critique | |
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| | 11.2 | Response | |
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| References | |
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| Index |