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一、German labor market and fiscal reforms 1999 to 2008: Can they be blamed for intra-Euro Area imbalances?

             In this paper,we assess the impact ofmajor German structural reforms from1999 to 2008 on key macroeconomic variables within a two-country monetary union DSGE model. Bymany, these reforms, especially the Hartz reforms on the labormarket, are considered to be the root of thereafter observed imbalances in the Euro Area. We find that, in terms of German GDP, consumption, investment and (un)employment, the reforms were a clear success albeit the impact on the German trade balance and the current account was onlyminor. Most importantly, the rest of the Euro Area benefited frompositive spillover effects. Hence, our analysis suggests that the reforms cannot be held responsible for the currently observed macroeconomic imbalances within the Euro Area.
Keywords:    Fiscal Policy,Labor Market Reforms,DSGE modeling,Macroeconomics

804389837.pdf (970.57 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

2015-1-14 12:57:54 上传

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1.1，The Economic Impact of Civil Justice Reforms
Date:    2014-09
By:    Dimitri Lorenzani
Federico Lucidi

Quality, independence and efficiency are the key components of effective justice systems, a crucial condition to ensure the proper functioning of important drivers of growth in the EU. This paper focuses on judicial efficiency and investigates the impact of certain structural reforms affecting the civil justice system on selected economic outcomes, such as business dynamics and foreign direct investments (FDI). In doing so, the role of efficiency of justice systems (measured by disposition time and the ratio of pending cases to population, both referred to litigious civil and commercial disputes) is highlighted as a transmission channel linking judicial reforms to economic variables. The work draws upon a dataset based on the reports by the Council of Europe's European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ). The results support the growth potential of judicial reforms rationalising the organisation of courts, fostering investment in in-court ICT and introducing incentives to reduce excessive litigation rates (for instance by enhancing the use of alternative disputes resolution methods), which are all found to positively affect the efficiency of civil justice. By increasing the efficiency of the justice system, these reforms can enhance entrepreneurial activity (as measured by firms' entry rates) and FDI.
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1.2 Future Directions for the Irish Economy. Conference Proceedings

Graham Stull

Future Directions for the Irish Economy. Conference Proceedingspdf(2 MB) Choose translations of the previous link

Ireland's successful conclusion of the financial assistance programme provides an important opportunity to assess the prospects of the Irish economy to achieve good growth, to prevent future banking crises and to lock in budgetary and fiscal improvements that were achieved over the course of the Programme. It is also a natural opportunity to assess the adjustment undertaken under the programme, with a view to identifying lessons learned that can contribute to the academic debate, or that can serve as policy guidance for other countries facing similar economic challenges.

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2015-1-14 13:29:11 上传

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Merger Performance and Managerial Incentives
By:    Matthias Kräkel and Daniel Müller

We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low synergies—even when targets with high synergies are available—to obtain high-powered incentives and, hence, a high personal income at the merger-management stage.
Keywords:    acquisition; merger; moral hazard

bgse02_2014.pdf (442.87 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

2015-1-14 13:48:17 上传

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On the Equivalence between Iterated Application of Choice Rules and Common Belief of Applying these Rules
Date:    2014-11-25
By:    Michael Trost (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena)

One central issue tackled in epistemic game theory is whether for a general class of strategic games the solution generated by iterated application of a choice rule gives exactly the strategy profiles that might be realized by players who follow this choice rule and commonly believe they follow this rule. For example, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Tan and Werlang (1988) have established that this coincidence holds for the choice rule of strict undominance in mixtures in the class of finite strategic games, and Mariotti (2003) has established that this coincidence holds for Bernheim's (1984) choice rule of point rationality in the class of strategic games in which the strategy sets are compact Hausdorff and the payoff functions are continuous. In this paper, we aim at studying this coincidence in a general way. We seek to figure out general conditions of the choice rules ensuring it for a general class of strategic games. We state four substantial assumptions on choice rules. If the players' choices rules satisfy - besides the technical assumption of regularity - the properties of reflexivity, monotonicity, Aizerman's property, and the independence of payoff equivalent conditions, then this coincidence applies. This result proves to be strict in the following sense. None of the four substantial properties can be omitted without eliminating the coincidence.
Keywords:    Iterative deletion procedure, common belief, choice rule, epistemic game theory

On the Equivalence between Iterated Application of Choice Rules and Common Belief of Applying these Rules
Date:    2014-11-25
By:    Michael Trost (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena)

One central issue tackled in epistemic game theory is whether for a general class of strategic games the solution generated by iterated application of a choice rule gives exactly the strategy profiles that might be realized by players who follow this choice rule and commonly believe they follow this rule. For example, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Tan and Werlang (1988) have established that this coincidence holds for the choice rule of strict undominance in mixtures in the class of finite strategic games, and Mariotti (2003) has established that this coincidence holds for Bernheim's (1984) choice rule of point rationality in the class of strategic games in which the strategy sets are compact Hausdorff and the payoff functions are continuous. In this paper, we aim at studying this coincidence in a general way. We seek to figure out general conditions of the choice rules ensuring it for a general class of strategic games. We state four substantial assumptions on choice rules. If the players' choices rules satisfy - besides the technical assumption of regularity - the properties of reflexivity, monotonicity, Aizerman's property, and the independence of payoff equivalent conditions, then this coincidence applies. This result proves to be strict in the following sense. None of the four substantial properties can be omitted without eliminating the coincidence.
Keywords:    Iterative deletion procedure, common belief, choice rule, epistemic game theory

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二、Fiscal Consolidation and Sovereign Risk in the Euro-zone Periphery
Date:    2014-11
By:    Elton Beqiraj
Massimiliano Tancioni

Sovereign and private sector default probabilities are introduced in a monetary model to evaluate whether the consideration of a sovereign risk channel can affect the size and sign of fiÂ…scal multipliers, an hypothesis recently appeared in the literature. The model is estimated using data of EZ peripheral countries. From posterior estimates and simulations we show that i) the relation between fundamentals, sovereign risk and interest rate spreads is weak; ii) in the short term, the risk channel operates in a pro- cyclical direction, amplifying the effects of Â…fiscal contractions; iii) the consideration of a liquidity trap does not reverse this result.
Keywords:    default risk, interest rates, Â…fiscal policy, monetary policy, liquidity trap, Bayesian estimation

wp167.pdf (1.42 MB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

2015-1-14 13:03:07 上传

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Strategic Inaccuracy in Bargaining
Date:    2014-11
By:    Hidir, Sinem

This paper studies a buyer-seller game with pre-trade communication of private horizontal taste from the buyer followed by a take it or leave it offer by the seller. The amount of information transmitted improves the gains from trade, but also determines how this surplus will be shared between the two. Lack of commitment to a price creates a hold-up problem and a trade off between efficiency and rent extraction. In this setting, coarse information arises due to the concerns on the terms of the transaction. As the preferences get less important, information transmission becomes less precise. It is shown that in the buyer optimal equilibria of the static and dynamic games, the messages sent are just informative enough to ensure trade. In the dynamic game, the buyer is always better off sending infor- mative messages only at the first period, implying no gains from gradual revelation of information.
Keywords:    information; cheap-talk; bargaining; buyer-seller relation

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2015-1-14 13:38:54 上传

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三、European Integration and the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle
Date:    2014-11
By:    Margarita Katsimi (Athens University of Economics and Business)
Gylfi Zoega (Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics, Birkbeck)

We estimate the Feldstein-Horioka equation for the period 1960-2012 and find structural breaks that coincide with the introduction of the European single market in 1993, the introduction of the euro in 1999 and the financial crisis in 2008. The results suggest that the correlation between investment and savings depends on institutions, exchange rate risk and credit risk. Furthermore, we find that the pattern of capital flows within the euro zone reflect differences in output per capita, the rate of growth of output per capita and budget balances.
Keywords:    Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, European integration.
BWPEF1410.pdf (509.71 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

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3.1 Monetary disunion: The domestic politics of Euroland
Date:    2014
By:    Streeck, Wolfgang
Elsässer, Lea

Regional disparities within the European Union have always been perceived as an impediment to monetary integration. This is why discussions on a joint currency, from their very beginning, were linked to compensatory payments in the form of regional policy payments. Structural assistance to poor regions and member states increased sharply at the end of the 1980s. Today, however, fiscal support has to be shared with the new member states in the East. Moreover, due to the financial crisis, the cheap credit that poor EMU member countries enjoyed as a result of interest rate convergence is no longer available. We predict that in the future, some sort of financial aid will have to be provided by rich member countries to poor ones, if only to prevent a further increase in economic disparities and related political instability. We also expect long-lasting distributional conflict between payer and recipient countries far beyond current rescue packages, together with disagreement on the extent of aid required and the political control to be conceded by receiving countries to giving countries. We illustrate the dimension of the distributional conflict by comparing income gaps and relative population size between the center and the periphery of Europe on the one hand and on the other, between rich and poor regions in two European nation-states characterized by large regional disparities, Germany and Italy. While income gaps and population structures are similar in the two countries to those between Northern Europe and the Mediterranean periphery, regional redistribution is much more extensive in the two nation-states. We conclude that this presages a difficult future for the domestic politics of Euroland.Regionale Disparitäten in der Europäischen Union galten immer als Hindernis für den währungspolitischen Integrationsprozess. Aus diesem Grund waren die Verhandlungen über eine zukünftige Währungsunion von Anfang an mit Forderungen nach Ausgleichszahlungen in Form von regionalpolitischen Hilfsprogrammen verknüpft. Strukturhilfen an arme Regionen und Mitgliedsstaaten wurden Ende der 1980er-Jahre erhöht. Heute müssen die entsprechenden Mittel allerdings mit den neuen Mitgliedsstaaten im Osten geteilt werden. Zudem können die ärmeren EWU-Mitglieder seit der Finanzkrise keine günstigen Kredite mehr aufnehmen. Wir gehen davon aus, dass es auch in Zukunft finanzielle Transfers von den reichen zu den armen Mitgliedsstaaten wird geben müssen, selbst wenn sie nur dazu dienen, stärkere wirtschaftliche Disparitäten und damit einhergehende politische Instabilität zu verhindern. Zudem können über die gegenwärtigen Rettungsmaßnahmen hinaus lang anhaltende zwischenstaatliche Verteilungskonflikte zwischen Geber- und Empfängerländern erwartet werden, in welchen es vor allem um den Umfang der Finanzhilfen und die im Gegenzug verlangte Abgabe politischer Kontrolle durch die Empfänger von Transfers gehen wird. Um die Dimension des Verteilungskonflikts zu veranschaulichen, vergleicht der Aufsatz Einkommenslücken und relative Bevölkerungsgrößen zwischen Peripherie und Zentrum der EU mit denen zwischen armen und reichen Regionen zweier Nationalstaaten mit starken regionalen Disparitäten, Italien und Deutschland. Während Einkommenslücken und Bevölkerungsstruktur in den beiden Nationalstaaten denen innerhalb der EWU ähneln, ist die regionale Umverteilung in den Nationalstaaten weitaus höher. Wir schließen daraus, dass die Innenpolitik der Eurozone konfliktreich sein wird.

806912928.pdf (2.6 MB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

2015-1-14 13:31:21 上传

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How much of bank credit risk is sovereign risk? Evidence from the eurozone
Date:    2014-10
By:    Junye Li (ESSEC Business School)
Gabriele Zinna (Bank of Italy)

We develop a multivariate credit risk model for the term structures of sovereign and bank credit default swaps. First, we separate the probability of joint defaults of large Eurozone sovereigns (systemic risk) from that of sovereign-specific defaults (country risk). Then, we quantify individual banks' exposures to each type of sovereign risk, as well as bank-specific credit risk. Banks� sovereign risk exposures vary with banks� size, their holdings of sovereign debt, and expected government support. On average, 45% of French and Spanish banks' credit risk consists in sovereign risk, compared with only 30% for Italian and 23% for German banks. Furthermore, short- to medium-term contracts are particularly informative on sovereign systemic risk.
Keywords:    Sovereign and Bank Credit Risk; Credit Default Swaps; Distress Risk Premia; Bayesian Estimation.

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Convergence of European Business Cycles: A Complex Networks Approach
Date:    2014-11
By:    Theophilos Papadimitriou (Department of Economics, Democritus University of Thrace, Greece)
Periklis Gogas (Department of Economics, Democritus University of Thrace, Greece; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, Italy)
Georgios-Antonios Sarantitis (Department of Economics, Democritus University of Thrace, Greece)


We examine the co-movement patterns of European business cycles during the period 1986-2011, with an obvious focal point the year 1999 that marked the introduction of the common currency, the euro. The empirical analysis is performed within the context of Graph Theory where we apply a rolling window approach in order to dynamically analyze the evolution of the network that corresponds to the GDP growth rate cross-correlations of 22 European economies. The main innovation of our study is that the analysis is performed by introducing what we call the Threshold-Minimum Dominating Set (T-MDS). We provide evidence at the network level and analyze its structure and evolution by the metrics of total network edges, network density, isolated nodes and the cardinality of the T-MDS set. Next, focusing on the country level, we analyze each individual country's neighborhood set (economies with similar growth patterns) in the pre- and post-euro era in order to assess the degree of convergence to the rest of the economies in the network. Our empirical results indicate that despite few economies' idiosyncratic behavior, the business cycles of the European countries display an overall increased degree of synchronization and convergence in the single currency era.

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Economic Impact of Late Payments                                William Connell
                                
Delays in payments in Business to Business (B2B) and Government to Business (G2B) transactions generally have an adverse effect on the cash-flow of firm and can cause firms, particularly small ones, to seek extensions of their overdraft facilities and increase their borrowing. Late payment of commercial debt can play a significant role in the survival of firms as their liquidity can be severely affected, even forcing some firms to exit the market. This has been particularly important during the economic and financial crisis as access to credit has been more restricted.
                                        This note addresses the economic effect of late payments by approximating the possible financial cost for firms and by estimating the empirical link between late payments and the exit rate of firms. Both payment delays in G2B and B2B transactions are considered. The note focuses on four EU countries where late payments are a serious problem (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece), but the econometric analysis linking late payments with exit rates uses a broader set of Member States and thus the results can be easily extended to other countries.
                                        This work was carried out in the context of an ECFIN project which main findings are presented in the report:European Commission (2014) "Market reforms at work in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece", European Economy 5|2014
                                                                    
                                (European Economy. Economic Papers. 531. September 2014.                                                         Brussels. PDF. 28pp. Tab. Graph. Ann. Bibliogr. Free.)
ecp531_en.pdf (896.88 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

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Auctions vs. Negotiations:The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation
Date:    2014-11-25
By:    Herweg, Fabian
Schmidt, Klaus M.

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and if the buyer's bargaining position is sufficiently strong. Moreover, we show that negotiations provide stronger incentives for sellers to investigate possible design improvements than auctions. This provides an explanation for the widespread use of negotiations as a procurement mechanism in private industry.
Keywords:    Auctions; Negotiations; Procurement; Renegotiation; Adaptation Costs; Loss Aversion; Behavioral Contract Theory.
484.pdf (451.21 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

2015-1-14 13:42:41 上传

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A Competitive Partnership Formation Process
Date:    2013
By:    Andersson, T.
Gudmundsson, J.
Talman, A.J.J. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)
Yang, Z.

A group of heterogenous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have incentives to break up or form new partnerships. This paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively disproves the existence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps. When an equilibrium exists, partnership and revenue distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the process. Moreover, several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution and the model are derived.
Keywords:    Partnership formation; adjustment process; equilibrium; assignment market

2013-008.pdf (243.73 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

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[size=+2]Allocation Games with Caps: From Captain Lotto to All-Pay Auctions                             
Abstract

A Lotto game is a two-person zero-sum game where each player chooses adistribution on nonnegative real numbers with given expectation, so asto maximize the probability that his realized choice is higher than hisopponent's. These games arise in various competitive allocation setups(e.g., contests, research and development races, political campaigns,Colonel Blotto games). A Captain Lotto game is a Lotto game withcaps,which are upper bounds on the numbers that may be chosen. First, wesolve the Captain Lotto games. Second, we show how to reduce all-payauctions to simpler games—expenditure games—using the solution ofthe corresponding Lotto games. As a particular application we solveall-pay auctions with unequal caps, which yield a significant increasein the seller's revenue (or, the players' efforts).
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Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation
Date:    2014
By:    Bester, Helmut
Dahm, Matthias

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low–cost service is sufficient or whether a high–cost treatment is required to solve the consumer’s problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and signals are not observable. Treatments are contractible, but success or failure of the low–cost treatment is observed only by the consumer. Payments can therefore not depend on the objective outcome but only the consumer’s report, or subjective evaluation. A failure of the low–cost treatment delays the solution of the consumer’s problem by the high–cost treatment to a second period. We show that the first–best solution can always be implemented if the parties’ discount rate is zero; an increase in the discount rate reduces the range of parameter combinations for which the first–best can be obtained. In an extension we show that the first–best is also always implementable if diagnosis and treatment can be separated by contracting with two different agents.
Keywords:    credence goods; information acquisition; moral hazard; subjective evaluation

483.pdf (214.81 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

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Inefficient equilibria and lockouts in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time.
Date:    2014-09
By:    Ahmet Ozkardas (Turgut Özal Üniversitesi et Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne)
Agnieszka Rusinowska (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics)

We consider a union-firm wage bargaining in which the preferences of the union and the firm are expressed by sequences of discount rates varying in time. The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, we consider a model in which the union must choose between strike and holdout in case of disagreement. We show that there exist inefficient subgame perfect equilibria in the model where the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement. Furthermore, we analyze a wage bargaining in which the firm is allowed to engage in lockouts. We consider a game in which only lockouts are feasible, i.e., strikes are not allowed. We prove that under certain assumptions there is a subgame perfect equilibrium for this game and it leads to an immediate agreement which yields the union a wage contract smaller that the statuts quo contract. Under this equilibrium the firm always locks out the union after its own offer is rejected and holds out after rejecting an offer of the union.
Keywords:    Union, firm bargaining, varying discount rates, subgame perfect equilibrium, inefficient equilibria, strike, lockouts.
14073.pdf (504.85 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

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Equilibrium Paths in Discounted Supergames
Date:    2014-12
By:    Kimmo Berg (Systems Analysis Laboratory, Aalto University School of Science)
Mitri Kitti (Department of Economics, University of Turku)

This paper characterizes the subgame-perfect pure-strategy equilibrium paths in discounted supergames with perfect monitoring. It is shown that all the equilibrium paths are composed of fragments called elementary subpaths. This characterization result is complemented with an algorithm for finding the elementary subpaths. By using these subpaths it is possible to generate equilibrium paths and payoffs. When there are finitely many elementary subpaths, all the equilibrium paths can be represented by a directed graph. These graphs can be used in analyzing the complexity of equilibrium outcomes. In particular, it is shown that the size and the density of the equilibrium set can be measured by the asymptotic growth rate of equilibrium paths and the Hausdorff dimension of the payoff set.
Keywords:    repeated game, subgame-perfect equilibrium, equilibrium path, graph presentation of paths, complexity

dp96.pdf (3.34 MB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

2015-1-14 14:19:25 上传

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Precision of Market-Generated Information in Economies with Coordination Motives
Date:    2014
By:    Myungkyu Shim (University of California, San Diego)
Giacomo Rondina (University of California, San Diego)

a class of economies where firms display coordination motives in presence of dispersed information and where the outcome of the coordination is traded in a competitive asset market ´a-la Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). We show that when more private information is injected in the coordination economy the equilibrium asset price becomes less informative. To showcase the relevance of our result we present an application to a problem of endogenous information choice where the "Knowing What Others Know" property of information acquisition derived by Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) breaks down in presence of market-generated information.
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