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11
sjfsong 发表于 2015-1-14 14:24:42 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群
Product Customization in the Spokes Model
Date:    2014-11
By:    Aoki, Reiko
Hillas, John
Kao, Tina

We use a spokes model to analyze ?ms?customization incentives when facing the choices of standard and niche products. Products at or near the end of the spokes are customized products, while products near the origin are more standardized products that cater to the taste of many consumers. Our results indicate that although monopolist always offers the standard product, if a ?m anticipates entry, it may choose to stake claim to a customized product. For low transportation costs, the early entrant chooses the standard product. But this equilibrium is characterized by aggressive pricing behavior.
Keywords:    product differentiation, product customization, entry, spatial oligopoly

wp2014-8.pdf (408.14 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

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12
sjfsong 发表于 2015-1-14 14:35:02 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群
Optimal Joint Liability Lending and with Costly Peer Monitoring
Date:    2014
By:    Carli, Francesco
Uras, R.B. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

This paper characterizes an optimal group loan contract with costly peer monitoring. Using a fairly standard moral hazard framework, we show that the optimal group lending contract could exhibit a joint-liability scheme. However, optimality of joint-liability requires the involvement of a group leader, who heavily takes care of the partner's repayment share in bad states and gets compensated in expected terms. This key result holds even for a group of borrowers, which exhibits homogeneous characteristics in productivity, risk aversion and monitoring costs. Our work rationalizes the widely-applied group-leadership concept of microfinance programmes as an outcome of an optimal contract.
Keywords:    Micro finance; Joint-liability; Group leader.

2014_075.pdf (336.22 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)
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13
sjfsong 发表于 2015-1-14 14:38:31 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群
Subsistence induced and complementarity induced irrelevance in preferences


Abstract

In a two-good setting we axiomatize (a) preferences with subsistence consumption and (b) a generalized version of Leontief preferences. Our axiomatization allows for different levels of subsistence and captures the presence of poverty and prosperity. Our axioms are based on the irrelevance of one of the goods at certain consumption bundles. For subsistence, the irrelevance is induced by the subsistence requirement and for generalized Leontief, it is induced by complementarity. We capture this difference using the notion of unhappy sets.

MPRA_paper_59474.pdf (714.18 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

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14
sjfsong 发表于 2015-1-14 14:50:33 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群
Dynamic monopoly with demand delay
Date:    2014-11
By:    Akio Matsumoto
Keiko Nakayama

Implicit in the text-book monopoly is an assumption of complete and instantaneous information or knowledge available to economic agents at free of charge. Under such circumstances, knowing the certain price and cost functions, the monopolist can make an optimal decision of price and output to maximize its profit and realize it. As a result, the text-book monopoly model becomes static in nature. There are, however, many empirical works to indicate that such an assumption of rational economic agents goes too far. In reality the monopolist is boundedly rational and adjusts its price and output as a function of its limited knowledge and past experiences. To fill this gap, we propose, in this study, to relax this assumption and develop a dynamic monopoly model. In particular, we assume first that the monopolist has only partial information about the market condition and second that the monopolist obtains it with time delay. In natural consequence of these alternations, the monopolist cannot jump to the optimal point but searches for it with using the actual data obtained through the market. The modified model becomes dynamic in nature. This is the issue far outside the scope of the text book monopoly and it is what we will consider in this study. In the recent literature, various learning processes of the boundedly rational monopolist have been extensively studied. Puu [1995, CSF] constructs a discrete-time monopoly model in which price function is cubic and cost function is linear. It is shown that the gradient learning or search process based on locally obtained information might behave in an erratic way under the condition that the price function has an inflection point. Assuming that the monopolist uses a rule of thumb to determine quantity to produce, Naimzada and Ricchiute [2008, AMC] reconsider Puu's model with a linear cost function and a cubic price function without the inflection point. Their model is then generalized by Askar [2013, EM] who replaces the cubic function with higher-order polynomials. Matsumoto and Szidarovszky [2013] further generalize Asker's model by introducing the more general type of the cost function. Since those models are described by one dimensional difference equation, chaotic dynamics can arise via period-doubling bifurcation. In this study we reconsider a dynamic monopoly model from two different points of view. First, to detect the effect caused by non-instantaneous information, the dynamic process is constructed in continuous-time scales and a fixed time delay is introduced. Second, we discretize the continuous process to obtain a 'delay' discrete process and analyse the delay effect on discrete dynamics. In both models, local stability of a stationary state is analytically considered and global dynamics is numerically examined.
Keywords:    Dynamic monopoly; bounded rational; time delay; nonlinea dnamics

e140826aFinal00040.pdf (155.18 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

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15
sjfsong 发表于 2015-1-14 15:04:41 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群
Price Discrimination in Asymmetric Industries: Implications for Competition and Welfare
Date:    2014-11
By:    Hinnerk Gnutzmann (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore)

Price discrimination by consumer's purchase history is widely used in regulated industries, such as communication or utilities, both by incumbents and entrants. I show that such discrimination can have surprisingly negative welfare eects { even though prices and industry prots fall, so does consumer surplus. Earlier studies that did not allow entrants to discriminate or assumed symmetric rms yielded sharply dierent results, the pro{competitive eect of price discrimination are stronger in these settings. Imposing a pricing constraint on incumbent's discrimination leads the entrant to discriminate more heavily, but still improves both consumer and producer welfare.
Keywords:    History{based price discrimination, asymmetric price discrimination, switching cost

economia-finanza-def19.pdf (489.62 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

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16
sjfsong 发表于 2015-1-14 15:05:49 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群
The Beauty Contest and Short-Term Trading
Date:    2014-11-26
By:    Giovanni Cespa (Cass Business School, CEPR, and CSEF)
Xavier Vives (IESE Business School)

Short-termism need not breed informational price inefficiency even when generating Beauty Contests. We demonstrate this claim in a two-period market with persistent liquidity trading and risk-averse, privately informed, short-term investors and find that prices reect average expectations about fundamentals and liquidity trading. Informed investors engage in "retrospective" learning to reassess inferences (about fundamentals) made during the trading game's early stages. This behavior introduces strategic complementarities in the use of information and can yield two stable equilibria that can be ranked in terms of liquidity, volatility, and informational efficiency. We derive implications that explain market anomalies as well as empirical regularities.
Keywords:    price speculation, multiple equilibria, average expectations, public information, momentum and reversal

wp383.pdf (957.44 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

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17
sjfsong 发表于 2015-1-14 15:09:58 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群
Contributing to Public Goods as Individuals versus Group Representatives: Evidence of Gender Differences
Date:    2014-07-30
By:    Hauge, Karen Evelyn (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research,)
Røgeberg, Ole (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research,)

We report evidence from a laboratory experiment comparing contributions in public good games played as individuals to contributions made as group representatives. We find that women alter their behaviour more than men. The change is in an out-group friendly direction: while men’s contributions are largely similar across the two treatments, women increase their contributions by 40% on average as group representatives. The results are consistent with empirical research from labour markets suggesting that female corporate leaders emphasize stakeholders beyond the shareholders to a larger extent than men, and they are in line with stereotypes commonly held regarding male and female leaders.
Keywords:    responsibility; group representative; gender; public good game; laboratory experiment

memo-16-2014.pdf (300.14 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

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18
sjfsong 发表于 2015-1-14 15:29:45 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群
The Shaping Power of Market Prices and Individual Choices on Preferences. An Experimental Investigation
Date:    2014-12-01
By:    Sergio Beraldo
Valerio Filoso
Marco Stimolo

We repeatedly elicited individuals' Willingness to Accept (WTA) evaluations for an auctioned bad in an experimental setting in which truthful revelation is the (weakly) dominant strategy. We investigate whether the observation of supposedly irrelevant signals (the market price, the asks at either the bottom or the top of the distribution of asks) affect the elicited values. Our experimental sample was made up of 162 subjects partitioned in 18 independent markets characterized by different informational conditions. Our analysis provide two main findings. First, individuals’ WTA evaluations are remarkably driven by a strong although unexpected tendency to conform to the asks either at the bottom or the top of the distribution by a factor of 44-66\%. Second, although a clear tendency to adapt one's own ask to the market price (Shaping effect) emerges when no other information is being provided, the provision of information about the actual behavior of well identified (groups of) individuals more than halves its magnitude, suggesting that this effect may also qualify as a peculiar case of conformity. We conjecture that in the context at hand conformity emerges as an adaptive response to a problem of preferences imprecision. Our results are identified by means of a methodology not yet employed in the field, which helps in distinguishing between the dynamic and the asymptotic features of preference formation in the presence of either adaptive or rational expectations. The overall evidence suggests a decisive role for market interactions in the definition of preferences.
Keywords:    Endogenous preferences, Shaping effect, Conformity, Experimental Vickrey auction.

2014-191.pdf (690.89 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

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19
sjfsong 发表于 2015-1-14 15:38:25 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群
Uncertain Penalties and Compliance
By:    Carol Luengo
Marcelo Caffera
Carlos Chávez

Using a series of laboratory economic experiments, we study the effect of information regarding the amount of the fine on the individual decision to violate an emission standard. Specifically, the analysis considers variations in the information available for the regulated subjects regarding the amount of the monetary sanction, as well as variations in the stringency in the inspection effort by the regulator. Our results suggest that in the case of a regulation design that induces compliance, the presence of uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine may increase violations in certain cases. When enforcement is not sufficient to induce compliance, the uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine does not have any effect on the level of transgression. Overall, the results suggest that a cost-effective regulation design should consider including public information on the consequences of an offense.
Keywords:    s Uncertainty; Risk; Compound risk; Fine; Emission standard; Economic experiment

working_paper_um_cee_2014_07.pdf (568.27 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

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20
sjfsong 发表于 2015-1-14 15:48:45 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

Date:    2013-03
By:    Erlend Berg
Maitreesh Ghatak
R Manjula
D Rajasekhar
Sanchari Roy

This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance in the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to another. In a randomised field experiment undertaken across 151 villages in South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a public health insurance programme. Relative to at pay, incentive pay improves knowledge transmission to households that are socially distant from the agent, but not to households similar to the agent.
Keywords:    public services, information constraints, incentive pay, social proximity, knowledge transmission

eopp42.pdf (336.87 KB)


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