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Risky Choices of Poor People: Comparing Risk Preference Elicitation Approaches in Field Experiments
Date:    2014-11-18
By:    Holden , Stein (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences)

This paper studies the risk preferences of poor rural households in Malawi and compares the Holt and Laury (2002) (HL) multiple price list approach with hypothetical real-world framing and monetary incentive-compatible framing with the Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) (TCN) monetary framing approach to elicit prospect theory parameters. The consistency of the results, the role of and potential bias attributable to measurement error, and correlations with socioeconomic characteristics are assessed. The study shows that measurement error can lead to upward bias in risk aversion estimates and over-weighting of low probabilities. The hypothetical real–world HL framing experiments are associated with higher sensitivity to background variation such as exposure to a recent drought shock and distance to markets/poor market access.
Keywords:    expected utility theory; prospect theory; risk preferences; loss aversion; probability weighting; field experiment; multiple price lists; measurement error; Malawi
JEL:    C93 D03 O12
clts_wp_10_14.pdf (1.16 MB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

2015-1-14 15:53:50 上传

Risky Choices of Poor People: Comparing Risk Preference Elicitation Approaches in Field Experiments
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Self-Confidence, Overconfidence and Prenatal Testorone Exposure : Evidence from the Lab
Date:    2014
By:    Dalton, P.S. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)
Ghosal, S.

Abstract: This paper examines whether the degree of confi dence and overconfi dence in one's ability is determined biologically. In particular, we study whether foetal testosterone exposure correlates with an incentive-compatible measure of con fidence within an experimental setting. We fi nd that men (rather than women) who were exposed to high testosterone levels in their mother's womb are less likely to overestimate their actual performance, which in turn helps them to gain higher monetary rewards. Men exposed to low prenatal testosterone levels, instead, set unrealistically high expectations which results in self-defeating behavior. These results from the lab are able to recon- cile hitherto disconnected evidence from the fi eld, by providing a link between traders' overcon fidence bias, long-term financial returns and prenatal testosterone exposure.

2014-014.pdf (295.96 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

2015-1-14 16:04:23 上传

Self-Confidence, Overconfidence and Prenatal Testorone Exposure : Evidence from the Lab
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Tradeoffs between Self-interest and Other-Regarding Preferences Cause Willpower Depletion
By:    Hanna Fromell (University of Nottingham, School of Economics)
Daniele Nosenzo (University of Nottingham, School of Economics)
Trudy Owens (University of Nottingham, School of Economics)

In this paper we show that making choices that involve conflicts between self-interest and otherregarding concerns may deplete cognitive resources and willpower and thus reduce individuals' ability to exert self-control. In a lab experiment we use a series of modified dictator games to manipulate whether subjects are exposed to tradeoffs between their self-interest and the interest of others: in a Conflict treatment the option that maximizes the dictator's payoff always minimizes the recipient's payoff, whereas in the NoConflict treatment dictator’s and recipient’s payoffs are aligned. We then measure how decision-making in the dictator games affects subjects’ performance in a subsequent and unrelated task that requires exertion of willpower. We find that subjects in the Conflict treatment perform significantly worse than those in NoConflict. This effect is particularly marked for dictators who experienced a stronger conflict during the dictator games.
Keywords:    other-regarding preferences; willpower; self-control; depletion; dictator game; Stroop task.

cedex-discussion-paper-2014-14.pdf (952.25 KB, 需要: 1 个论坛币)

2015-1-15 09:18:15 上传

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The long-term impact of matching and rebate subsidies when public goods are impure: Field experimental evidence from the carbon offsetting market
Date:    2014
By:    Kesternich, Martin
Löschel, Andreas
Römer, Daniel

In this paper, we investigate both short- and long-term impacts of financial stimuli on public goods provision when contributions are tied to individual harm-related behavior. We conduct a large-scaled field experiment to examine voluntary contributions to a carbon offsetting program during the online purchase of a bus ticket. We systematically vary the individual payoff structure by introducing different matching grants (1/3:1, 1:1, 3:1) and price rebates (r-25%, r-50%, r-75%). Our results show that price rebates are more effective than matching schemes in raising participation rates while matching grants induce higher contributions to the offsetting program. We suspect differences in the personal responsibility for the compensated emissions to drive this result. Analyzing repeated bookings, we find decreasing treatment effects for returning customers except for the case of 1:1 matching grants. The equal matching scheme is also the only intervention that increases net contributions of customers compared to the control group.

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2015-1-15 09:19:33 上传

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Using artefactual field and lab experiments to investigate how fee-for-service and capitation affect medical service provision
Date:    2014-11-26
By:    Brosig-Koch , Jeannette (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration)
Hennig-Schmidt , Heike (Department of Health Management and Health Economics)
Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration)
Wiesen, Daniel (Department of Health Management and Health Economics)

We analyze how physicians, medical students, and non-medical students respond to nancial incentives from fee-for-service and capitation. We employ a series of artefactual eld and conventional lab experiments framed in a physician decision-making context. Physicians, participating in the eld, and medical and non-medical students, participating in lab experiments, respond to the incentives in a consistent way: Signi - cantly more medical services are provided under fee-for-service compared to capitation. Our ndings are robust regarding subjects' gender, age, and personality traits.
Keywords:    artefactual field Experiment; laboratory experiment; fee-for-service; capitation; physician behavior

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2015-1-15 09:20:43 上传

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The Effect of Perceived Regional Accents on Individual Economic Behavior: A Lab Experiment on Linguistic Performance, Cognitive Ratings and Economic Decisions
Date:    2014-11
By:    Heblich, Stephan (University of Bristol)
Lameli, Alfred (University of Marburg)
Riener, Gerhard (Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE))
URL:    http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8640&r=exp
Does it matter if you speak with a regional accent? Speaking immediately reveals something of one's own social and cultural identity, be it consciously or unconsciously. Perceiving accents involves not only reconstructing such imprints but also augmenting them with particular attitudes and stereotypes. Even though we know much about attitudes and stereotypes that are transmitted by, e.g. skin color, names or physical attractiveness, we do not yet have satisfactory answers how accent perception affects human behavior. How do people act in economically relevant contexts when they are confronted with regional accents? This paper reports a laboratory experiment where we address this question. Participants in our experiment conduct cognitive tests where they can choose to either cooperate or compete with a randomly matched male opponent identified only via his rendering of a standardized text in either a regional accent or standard accent. We find a strong connection between the linguistic performance and the cognitive rating of the opponent. When matched with an opponent who speaks the accent of the participant's home region – the in-group opponent –, individuals tend to cooperate significantly more often. By contrast, they are more likely to compete when matched with an accent speaker from outside their home region, the out-group opponent. Our findings demonstrate, firstly, that the perception of an out-group accent leads not only to social discrimination but also influences economic decisions. Secondly, they suggest that this economic behavior is not necessarily attributable to the perception of a regional accent per se, but rather to the social rating of linguistic distance and the in-group/out-group perception it evokes.
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Endogenous Preferences and Conformity: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
Date:    2014-12-01
By:    Sergio Beraldo (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF)
Valerio Filoso (Università di Napoli Federico II)
Marco Stimolo (Università di Napoli Federico II and Università di Salerno)

We repeatedly elicited individuals? Willingness to Accept (WTA) evaluations for an auctioned bad in an experimental setting in which truthful revelation is the (weakly) dominant strategy. We investigate whether the observation of supposedly irrelevant signals (the market price, the asks at either the bottom or the top of the distribution of asks) affect the elicited values. Our experimental sample was made up of 162 subjects partitioned in 18 independent markets characterized by different informational conditions. Our analysis provide two main findings. First, individuals? WTA evaluations are remarkably driven by a strong although unexpected tendency to conform to the asks either at the bottom or the top of the distribution by a factor of 44-66%. Second, although a clear tendency to adapt one?s own ask to the market price (Shaping effect) emerges when no other information is being provided, the provision of information about the actual behavior of well identified (groups of) individuals more than halves its magnitude, suggesting that this effect may also qualify as a peculiar case of conformity. We conjecture that in the context at hand conformity emerges as an adaptive response to a problem of preferences imprecision. Our results are identified by means of a methodology not yet employed in the field, which helps in distinguishing between the dynamic and the asymptotic features of preference formation in the presence of either adaptive or rational expectations. The overall evidence suggests a decisive role for market interactions in the definition of preferences.
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2015-1-15 09:24:57 上传

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Effects of Retirement and Lifetime Earnings Profile on Health Investment
Date:    2014
By:    Hernán Bejarano (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA)
Hillard Kaplan (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA and University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM)
Stephen Rassenti (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA)

We report the results of experiments where in each period of her lifetime the subject must choose how to allocate real earned income between health investment and life enjoyment in each period of a nine-period life in order to maximize aggregate life enjoyment. The key dynamic optimization challenge of the experiment to subjects derives from the fact that investments in health affect future income, but detract from current consumption. Our experimental results show that subjects were successful at reproducing the qualitative predictions of the theoretical model, investing more in health in the absence of retirement and with increasing income profiles. However, we did observe a systematic bias in health investments, being less than optimal in early periods and greater than optimal in late periods of life. We also found a significant effect due to social groupings. These results highlight the potential of lab experiments as a method to study health decisions and understand their determinants.
Keywords:    experimental economics, behavioral economics, health economics, dynamic programming
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2015-1-15 09:26:10 上传

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Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection
Date:    2014-12
By:    Aniol Llorente-Saguer (Queen Mary University of London)
Ro’i Zultan (Ben-Gurion University)

The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is likely to affect the bidding behavior in first-price (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which collusion is possible, but negotiations often break down and information is revealed in an asymmetric way. The existing theoretical analysis of our setup predicts that the first-price mechanism deters collusion. In contrast, we find the same level of collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the ensuing auction, leading to loss of efficiency and eliminating the revenue dominance typically observed in firstprice auctions.
Keywords:    Auctions, Collusion, Bribes, Experiment
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