1
文献名: Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed作者:Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine
期刊:Review of Economic Studies
卷号及页码:1992,59, 561-581.
电子链接:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527(199207)59:3%3C561:MARWSA%3E2.0.CO;2-0
2
文献名: Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games of Conflicting Interests作者:Schmidt, K.,
期刊:Econometrica
卷号及页码:1993,61, 325-351
电子链接:http://www.jstor.org/pss/2951554
3
文献名: Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information作者:Sorin, S.
期刊:Games and Economic Behavior.
卷号及页码:1999,29, 274-308
4
文献名: Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching作者:Ellison, G.
期刊:Review of Economic Studies
卷号及页码:1993,61, 567-588.
电子链接:http://www.jstor.org/pss/2297904
5
文献名: Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows作者:Ghosh, P. and D. Ray
期刊:Review of Economic Studies
卷号及页码:1996,63, 491-519.
电子链接:http://www.jstor.org/pss/2297892
6
文献名:Social Norms and Community Enforcement 作者:Kandori, M.期刊:Review of Economic Studies
卷号及页码:1992 ,59, 63-80.
电子链接:http://www.jstor.org/pss/2297925
[此贴子已经被作者于2008-9-20 17:55:09编辑过]


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