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文献名:A Common Pool Resource Game with Sequential Decisions and Experimental Evidence作者:Lluis Bru1, Susana Cabrera1, C. Monica Capra2 and Rosario Gomez1
期刊:
卷号及页码:
电子链接:http://www.springerlink.com/content/l31463134p6207q6/
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文献名: Collective action and the evolution of social norms作者:E. Ostrom,
期刊:, J. Econ. Perspect. 14 (3) (2000) 137–158.
卷号及页码:
电子链接:http://www.jstor.org/pss/2646923
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文献名: Cooperation in the commons作者:S. Polasky, N. Tarui, G.M. Ellis, C.F. Mason,
期刊:
卷号及页码:, Econ. Theory 29 (2006) 71–88.
电子链接:http://www.springerlink.com/content/k838r63626036677/
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文献名: Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is possible作者:E. Ostrom, J.M. Walker, R. Gardner,
期刊:, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 86(1992) 404–417.
卷号及页码:
电子链接:http://www.jstor.org/pss/1964229
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文献名: Noncooperative collusion under imperfect price information作者:E.J. Green, R.H. Porter,
期刊:, Econometrica 52 (1984) 87–100.
卷号及页码:
电子链接:http://www.jstor.org/pss/1911462
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文献名: Cooperative and non-cooperative harvesting in a stochastic sequential fishery作者:M. Laukkanen,
期刊:, J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 45 (2003)454–473.卷号及页码:
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