发帖
雷达卡
有谁能帮我解决下面的题目,谢谢!
Once upon a time, students in economics received no grades and worked only for
the pleasure of learning. In those days of yore, each student received cardinal utility G(x)
from working at the level of effort of x hours per day.
(i) At what level of effort did each student choose to work?
Then one dark day, grades were introduced. Now each student cares not only about
learning, but also about his relative standing in the class. If y is the average hours worked
per day by all the students, each student now has a utility function of the form:
G(x) + F(x/y)
where F' (.) > 0 and F (1) = 0
In this modern era, each student maximizes his utility with respect to the variable under
his own control, x, for a given level of y.
(ii) What are the equilibrium values of x, y, and utility?
Suppose now all students get together and hire a consultant to plan for the socially
optimal level of work.
(iii) What is the socially optimal value of x, and how does this differ from the decentralized
case above?
(iv) Why is it difficult for the students to reach this solution by individual choice of
work, without collusion or coercion?
(v) If hours of work were publicly measurable, how could the socially optimal solution
be achieved by quota or a tax/subsidy scheme?
京公网安备 11010802022788号
