新人求指导 TwT 贝叶斯均衡以及不完全信息博弈问题一枚

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                                                                                                                                                题目如下：
[size=12.000000pt]Nicolas would like to sell a company that he owns to Marc. Thecompany’s true value is an integer between 10 and 12 (including 1 and 12), inmillions of dollars. Marc has to make take-it-or-leave it offer, and Nicolas has todecide whether to accept the offer or to reject it. If Nicolas accepts the offer,the company is sold, Nicolas’s payoff is the amount he got, and Marc’s payoff isthe difference between the company’s true value and the amount that he paid. IfNicolas rejects the offer, tho company is not sold, Nicola’s payoff is the value ofthe company, and Marc’s payoff is zero. For each one of the following informationstructures, describe the situation as a game with incomplete information, and findall the Bayesian equilibria in the corresponding game. In each case, the descriptionof the situation is common knowledge among the players. In determining Nicolas’saction set, note that Nicolas knows what Marc’s offers is when he decides whetheror not accept the offer.
                                       

                                               
•                                                         Neither Nicolas nor Marc knows the company’s true value; both ascribe prob-ability [size=8.000000pt]1 to each possible value.
                                                          [size=8.000000pt]3
  
                                                 
•                                                         Nicolas knows the company’s true value, whereas Marc does not know it, andascribes probability [size=8.000000pt]1 to each possible value.
                                                          [size=8.000000pt]3
  
                                                 
•                                                         Marc does not know the company’s worth and ascribes probability [size=8.000000pt]1 to each[size=8.000000pt]3
                                                          possible value. Marc further ascribes probability [size=12.000000pt]p to the event that Nicolas
                                                          knows the value of the company, and probability 1[size=12.000000pt]−[size=12.000000pt]p to the event that Nicolas
                                                          does not know the value of the company, and instead ascribes probability [size=8.000000pt]1 to[size=8.000000pt]3
                                                          each possible value.
  
                                         

想了好久也做不出来，第一个还能勉强画一画，第二第三个就不会了。也不知道贝叶斯均衡怎么求，有没有大神帮帮我，跪求TwwT
                               
                       
               

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关键词：不完全信息博弈 贝叶斯均衡 不完全信息 完全信息 全信息 信息

图片怎么是乱码 TwwwT只能加载在图片里面了。。