扫描仪我没有啊,第2本书我倒是买得有。
Contents 1. Getting to work: 1.1 Politics sets the stage; 1.2 Designing for multiple goals; 1.3 Comparing seller revenues; 1.4 The academic critics; 1.5 Plan for this book; Section I. The Mechanism Design Approach: 2. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms: 2.1 Formulation; 2.2 Always optimal and weakly dominant strategies; 2.3 Balancing the budget; 2.4 Uniqueness; 2.5 Disadvantages of the Vickrey auction; 2.6 Conclusion; 3. The envelope theorem and payoff equivalence: 3.1 Hottelling’s lemma; 3.2 The envelope theorem in integral form; 3.3 Quasi-linear payoffs; 3.4 Conclusion; 4. Bidding equilibrium and revenue differences: 4.1 The single crossing conditions; 4.2 Deriving and verifying equilibrium strategies; 4.3 Revenue comparisons in the benchmark model; 4.4 Expected-revenue maximizing auctions; 4.5 Conclusion; 5. Interdependence of types and values: 5.1 Which models and assumptions are ‘useful’?; 5.2 Statistical dependence and revenue-maximizing auctions; 5.3 Wilson’s drainage tract model; 5.4 Correlated types model interdependent values; 5.5 Conclusion; 6. Auctions in context: 6.1 The profit and surplus contribution of an entrant; 6.2 Symmetric models with costly entry; 6.3 Asymmetric models: devices to promote competition; 6.4 After the bidding ends; 6.5 Conclusion; Section II. Multi-Unit Auctions: 7. Uniform price auctions: 7.1 Uniform price sealed bid auctions; 7.2 Simultaneous ascending auctions; 7.3 Conclusion; 8 Package auctions and combinatorial bidding: 8.1 Vickrey auctions and the monotonicity problems; 8.2 Bernheim-Whinston first-price package auctions; 8.3 Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auctions; 8.4 Conclusion.