Consider the following game
Each member of group of 20 has to choose a number between 0 and
100. The numbers do not have to be integers. The player whose choice
is closest to:
10+½*(the average of all other guesses)
wins $10. All other players receive 0. If two or more players are tied, they
split the money equally.
a) (5 points) What is the level 1 strategy?
b) (5 points) What is the level 2 strategy?
c) (8 points) What is the Nash Equilibrium of the game? Write down
your steps.
d) (5 points) What will happen in the experiment if the game is played
once? Explain your answer.
e) (5 points) What will happen in the experiment if the game is played
repeatedly? Explain your answer.
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谢谢各位了