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英文文献：Environmental Mechanism Designs in a New Order of Regulatory Capitalism
英文文献作者：Mullen, Jeffrey D.,Centner, Terence J.,Wetzstein, Michael E.
英文文献摘要：
Complexity of environmental programs is most apparent with information asymmetries, making the design of efficient mechanisms particularly challenging. As developed theoretically in this paper, a new regulatory capitalism paradigm mating voluntary agreements with environmental education can produce outcomes at least as efficient as voluntary agreements alone. Such a design exploits a key difference between voluntary agreements versus educational programs in terms of their impact on agents' incentive compatibilities. Specifically, in a principal-agent model, voluntary agreements are associated with an incentive-compatibility constraint, whereas educational programs are not. The efficient bundle will likely consist of a set of education programs and voluntary agreements. With the new order of regulatory capitalism, it is time to concentrate on removing barriers yielding inefficient mono-mechanism design and start constructing multidimensional incentives to efficiently allocate effort toward environmental and economic goals.
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