顺便补充一下：文章的题目与作者和摘要
1.Bounded rationality, institutions and uncertainty
David Dequech Jun 2001
Journal of Economics Issues
This paper assesses the usefulness and limitations of the notion of bounded rationality for a theory of economic behavior and institutions under uncertainty, in particular if this theory emphasizes institutions. The paper distinguishes the lack of knowledge caused by complexity from fundamental uncertainty, as well as from less strong notions of uncertainty. Next, the relation between bounded rationality and institutions is discussed. With qualifications, the paper criticizes Simon’s theory for focusing on rules of thumb that may be strictly individual and for not paying enough attention to the social context, to habits and to the tacit aspects of institutions. A theory of bounded rationality revised in the light of these criticisms would still be inadequate to study behavior under fundamental uncertainty. The paper then incorporates this type of uncertainty into a discussion of rationality and institutions. It argues against neglecting the connection between innovation and rationality or implying that innovation is not rational. People may use their knowledge to be partly unconventional. Animal spirits and creativity determine whether behavior breaks with the usual way of doing things or not.
2. Bounded Rationality: Static versus Dynamic Approach
Suren Basov December,2002
Two kinds of theories of the boundedly rational behavior are possible. Static theories focus on stationary behavior and do not include any explicit mech- anism for temporal change. Dynamic theories, on the other hand, explicitly model the fine-grain adjustments made by the subjects in response to their recent experiences. The main contribution of this paper is to argue that the restrictions usually imposed on the distribution of choices in the static approacharegenericallynotsupportedbyanexplicitadjustmentmechanism.
3. Perfect or Bounded Rationality? Some Facts, Speculations and Proposals
Werner Guth and Hartmut Kliemt
The paper focues on empirical studies of a class of very simple games of the reward allocation, ditator and ultimatum type. It is demonstrated that true explanations of social phenomena cannot conceivably be derived in terms of the perfect rationality concept underlying neo-classical economics. Analyzing the simple simple paradigm games it is explored in some depth, if speculatively, how experimental game theory might bring us closer to a new synthesis or the nucleus of a general theory of "games and boundedly rational economics behavior" with more explanatory power.
4.Structural stability implies Robustness to Bounded Rationality
Luca Anderlini David Canning
The introduction of a small amount of bounded rationality into a model sometimes has little e?ect, and sometimes has a dramatic impact on predicted behavior. We call a model robust to bounded rationality if small deviations from rationality result only in small changes in the equilibrium set. We also say that a model is structurally stable if the equilibrium set (given fully rational agents) varies continuously with the parameter values of the model. It is easy to see that when the equilibrium set is discontinuous, bounded rationality can have a very large impact on behavior in the neighborhood of the discontinuity. We go further and show that it is only at such discontinuities that bounded rationality can have large e?ects. It follows that a model is robust to bounded rationality if and only if it is structurally stable. Thus, we can characterize which models will be robust to bounded rationality and which will not, independently of the exact form that the bounded rationality takes
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