楼主: SANDL
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[经济] 关于auction theory 的问题 [推广有奖]

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SANDL 发表于 2009-11-29 07:35:09 |AI写论文

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哪位高人能够解以下2道题。小弟在此先拜谢过了~

Consider an sealed-bid auction with N bidders and private values. Valuations
are uniformly distributed on [0; 1]: The rules of the auction are as follows. The
highest bidder wins the auction and all bidders pay their own bid, except for
the winner, who pays the second-highest bid. Calculate equilibrium bidding
strategies for the case that N = 2.

Calculate equilibrium bidding strategies in an Amish auction with N bidders
where valuations are uniformly distributed on [0; 1]: An Amish auction is a first-
price sealed-bid auction in which the proceeds of the auction are divided equally
among the bidders. (hint: note that in this auction, the revenue equivalence
theorem no longer holds).
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关键词:auction Theory Theo AUC TIO Theory auction

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