Representation through Taxation
Social scientists teach that politicians favor groups that are organized over
those that are not. Representation through Taxation challenges this conventional
wisdom. Emphasizing that there are limits to what organized interests can credibly
promise in return for favorable treatment, Gehlbach shows that politicians
may instead give preference to groups – organized or not – that by their nature
happen to take actions that are politically valuable. Gehlbach develops
this argument in the context of the postcommunist experience, focusing on the
incentive of politicians to promote sectors that are naturally more tax compliant,
regardless of their organization. In the former Soviet Union, tax systems
were structured around familiar revenue sources,magnifying this incentive and
helping to prejudice policy against new private enterprise. In Eastern Europe,
in contrast, tax systems were created to cast the revenue net more widely, encouraging
politicians to provide the collective goods necessary for new firms
to flourish.
Scott Gehlbach is Professor of Political Science at the University of
Wisconsin–Madison.