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[行为经济学] 【推荐】行为经济学与契约理论研究 [推广有奖]

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清风寒江 发表于 2006-1-12 13:13:00 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群
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在契约理论的研究中,行为经济学关注问题的考虑日益受到重视。

特推荐几篇这方面的重要文献

一、CONTRACT DESIGN AND SELF-CONTROL THEORY AND EVIDENCE

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2004 119(2): 353-402.

STEFANO DELLAVIGNA AND ULRIKE MALMENDIER

摘要:How do rational firms respond to consumer biases? In this paper we analyze the profit-maximizing contract design of firms if consumers have time-inconsistent preferences and are partially naive about it. We consider markets for two types of goods: goods with immediate costs and delayed benefits (investment goods) such as health club attendance, and goods with immediate benefits and delayed costs (leisure goods) such as credit card-financed consumption. We establish three features of the profit-maximizing contract design with partially naive time-inconsistent consumers. First, firms price investment goods below marginal cost. Second, firms price leisure goods above marginal cost. Third, for all types of goods firms introduce switching costs and charge back-loaded fees. The contractual design targets consumer misperception of future consumption and underestimation of the renewal probability. The predictions of the theory match the empirical contract design in the credit card, gambling, health club, life insurance, mail order, mobile phone, and vacation time-sharing industries. We also show that time inconsistency has adverse effects on consumer welfare only if consumers are naive.

【We thank four exceptional referees, George Baker, Daniel Benjamin, Drew Fudenberg, Luis Garicano, Jerry Green, Oliver Hart, Caroline Hoxby, Markus Mo¨bius, Daniele Paserman, Ben Polak, Andrei Shleifer, and in particular Philippe Aghion, Edward Glaeser, Lawrence Katz, and David Laibson. We received helpful comments from participants of seminars at the Econometric Society Summer Meeting 2001, AEA Meeting 2002, the Behavioral Public Finance Conference 2003, the University of California at Berkeley, Humboldt University (Berlin), Bonn University, Boston University, Harvard University, INSEAD, University of Maryland (College Park), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Northwestern, Stanford, Yale, and Zurich universities. Nageeb Ali, Saurabh Bhargava, Madhav Chandrasekher, Tricia Glynn, Ming Mai, Boris Nenchev, and Christine Yee provided excellent research assistance. For financial support, DellaVigna thanks Bank of Italy and Harvard University, and Malmendier thanks Harvard University and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).】

37331.rar (181.2 KB) 本附件包括:

  • CONTRACT DESIGN AND SELF-CONTROL.pdf

[此贴子已经被作者于2006-1-12 13:19:12编辑过]

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关键词:行为经济学 理论研究 契约理论 行为经济 经济学 推荐 研究 理论 行为经济学 契约

本帖被以下文库推荐

胜负可争,是非难辨!
清风寒江 发表于 2006-1-12 13:22:00 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群
待续,请勿跟与本主题内容无关的非讨论性帖子。
胜负可争,是非难辨!

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清风寒江 发表于 2006-1-13 08:28:00 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群

二、A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation

( The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 114, Issue 3 - August 1999)

Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt

There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selfish types dominate equilibrium behavior.

37409.rar (3.94 MB) 本附件包括:
  • A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation.pdf

[此贴子已经被作者于2006-1-13 8:32:46编辑过]

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清风寒江 发表于 2006-1-14 09:26:00 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群

三、 Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In

Oliver Hartand John Moore

March 2004Revised May 2004

ABSTRACT

We view a contract as a list of outcomes. Ex ante, the parties commit not to consider outcomes not on the list, i.e., these are “ruled out”. Ex post, they freely bargain over outcomes on the list, i.e., the contract specifies no mechanism to structure their choice; in this sense outcomes on the list are not “ruled in”. A “loose” contract (long list) maximizes flexibility but may interfere with ex ante investment incentives. When these incentives are important enough, the parties may write a “tight” contract (short list), even though this leads to ex post inefficiency.

37459.rar (276.95 KB) 本附件包括:
  • e208-hart.pdf

[此贴子已经被作者于2006-1-14 9:26:39编辑过]

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Pararox 发表于 2006-1-14 13:33:00 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群

嗯,关于Contract的话题可以说是无法避免的,也有很多人在做。无奈,信息经济学的理论根基我还没有打好,我觉得,这应该是考虑契约问题最基本和最主流的方法,也是进深至行为发展的基础。所以感觉自己还不具备讨论深刻问题的条件。那就简单对清风的三篇文章做一个中文推荐吧:

第一篇我也是才看到,作者对商品二维划分方法比较有新意,不知此前是否已有人这么提出。即按照成本和收益的时间滞后的不一致性来划分商品。这样划分的好处和目的无非是更加方便定义行为变量,和处理已被广为接受的行为经济学的主旨——偏离(Anomalies),具体一点就是清风用红色强调的那个短语。

第二篇我早就看过,也是行为博弈论的奠基文章之一,由苏黎世(Zurich)大学的Fehr教授主持的实验。实际上是对经典的Ultimatum和Dictator实验的复杂化,方法是增加竞争机制。文章还是得到了一些很具有意义的结论,例如,人在面临竞争压力时候的决策会和没有这种压力时大相径庭,甚至截然相反!这篇文章也被作为Camerer教授的"Advances of BE"(行为经济学的进展)一书的第九章,人大也正在翻译并即将出版该书。

第三篇也是行为经济学目前关注的主要问题之一,即跨期决策的偏离及其规律。相关经典文献可以参看:

1.Shane Frederick, George Lowenstein, And Ted O'Donoghue: "Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review

2.Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Robin: "Doing it Now or Later"

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jasson 发表于 2008-1-9 17:42:00 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群

好东东

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wang8499 发表于 2008-1-14 06:50:00 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群
这个太高手了。。。

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xiaoguozi206 发表于 2008-10-1 23:25:00 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群

谢谢,高手高高手

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00190163 在职认证  发表于 2009-1-23 11:58:00 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群
赞,楼主牛,应该好好奖励一下。
简单爱

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dk1230 发表于 2009-2-5 20:37:00 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群
现在感兴趣阿!谢谢!!

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