发帖
雷达卡
英文文献：Evidence of shifts in intra-household allocation under exogenous changes in family policy and administrative procedures: The case of school enrollment in Chile-家庭政策和行政程序外生变化下家庭内部分配变化的证据:智利入学情况
英文文献作者：Heggeness, Misty L.
英文文献摘要：
In recent times, economists have argued the unitary model of household utility, which assumes households maximize a single utility function over one household budget constraint, does not accurately describe the economic behavior of households (Chiappori et al. 1993, Alderman et al. 1995, Rosenzweig & Stark 1997, Gray 1998). Some have found empirical evidence rejecting this model (Fortin & Lacroix 1997, Browing & Chiappori 1998, Rangel 2006). Instead, they argue, models should acknowledge the bargaining power of individuals to determine a household’s utility or preferences. This study examines the effects of exogenous changes in family policy and administrative processes on one household consumption variable, children’s education. Specifically, the legalization of divorce and family court wait times for divorce are analyzed. Using panel data and a difference-in-difference approach, I show that implementing pro-female divorce legislation shifts the bargaining power within married couple households, as does the speed with which family courts process divorce cases. Both pro-female divorce legislation and quick turn-around times for processing a divorce lead to an increase in school enrollment for children of married couples.
近年来，经济学家认为，家庭效用的单一模型(假设家庭在一个家庭预算约束下最大化单个效用函数)并不能准确地描述家庭的经济行为(Chiappori et al. 1993, Alderman et al. 1995, Rosenzweig & Stark 1997, Gray 1998)。一些人发现了反对这个模型的经验证据(Fortin & Lacroix 1997, Browing & Chiappori 1998, Rangel 2006)。相反，他们认为，模型应该承认个人在决定家庭效用或偏好方面的议价能力。本研究考察了家庭政策和行政过程的外生变化对家庭消费变量子女教育的影响。具体分析了离婚的合法化和家庭法院等待离婚的时间。利用面板数据和差异中的差异方法，我表明，实施支持女性离婚的立法改变了已婚夫妇家庭中的议价能力，也改变了家庭法庭处理离婚案件的速度。支持女性离婚的立法，以及办理离婚手续的快速周转时间，都导致已婚夫妇子女入学人数的增加。
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