上海财经大学经管学邀请对外经贸大学李建培讲座

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1 讲座主题
Signaling versus Costly Information Acquisition
2 主讲人背景
李建培，现为对外经济贸易大学教授，2007年从德国柏林洪堡大学取得经济学博士学位。主要研究领域为契约理论、产业组织理论和法经济学等。研究成果发表在Journal of Economic Theory、Rand Journal of Economics、Journal of Public Economics等期刊。

4 讲座内容摘要In Spence’s (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers’ productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers’ productivities. We characterize the tradeoffs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information acquisition is always associated with (partial) pooling of worker types, and education is used as a signal only if relatively few workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms, warranties, and initial public offerings.


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