|
昨天阅读2小时, 累计阅读172小时
Content: Chapter 3 thinking strategically
Reflection: chapter 3 focuses on simultaneous moves. Following rules had been recommended for these simultaneous moves:
1. If you had a dominant strategy, please use it;
2. Eliminate any dominated strategy from consideration and go on doing successively;
3. Have exhausted the simple avenues of looking for dominant strategy or ruling out dominated strategy, the next thing to do is to look for the equilibrium of the game.
Epilogue to Part 1 including chapter 1&2&3
A game is a situation of strategic interdependence : the outcome of your choice ( strategies) depends upon the choices of another person or persons acting purposively. The decision-maker involved in a game are called players, and their choice are called moves. The interests of the players in a game may be in strict conflict, one’s gain is always another’s loss. Such games are called zero-sum. But more typically, there are zone of commonality of interests as well as of conflict; there can be combinations of mutually gainful or mutually harmful strategies. Nevertheless, we usually refer to the other players in a game as one’s rival. The moves in a game may be sequential or simultaneous. In a game of sequential moves, there is a linear chain of thinking: if I do this, my rival can do that, and in turn I can respond in the following way…such a game is studied by drawing game tree. The best choice of moves can be founded by applying rule 1: look ahead and reason backward. In a game with simultaneous moves, there is a logical circle of reasoning: I think that he thinks that I think that… this circule must be squared; one must see through the rival’s action even though one can not see it when making one’s own move. To tackle such a game, construct a table that shows the outcomes corresponding to all conceivable combinations of choices. The process in the following steps. Begin by seeing if either side had a dominant strategy-one that outperforms all of that side’s other strategies, irrespective of the rival’s choice. This leads to rule 2: if you had a dominant strategy, use it. If you do not have a dominant strategy, but you rival does, then count on his using it and choose your best response accordingly. Next if neither side has a dominant strategy, see if either has a dominated strategy-one that is uniformly worse for the side playing it than another of its strategies. If so, apply rule 3: eliminate dominated strategies from consideration, go on doing so successively. If during the process any dominant strategies emerge in the smaller games,they shall be chosen successively. If the procedure ends in a unique outcome, you have found the prescriptions of action for the players and the outcome of the game. Even if the procedure does not lead to a unique outcome, it can reduce the size of the game to a more manageable level. Finally, if there are neither dominant nor dominated strategies, or after the game has been simplified as for as possible using the second step, apply rule 4: look for an equilibrium, a pair of strategies in which each player’s actions is the best response to the other’s. if there is a unique equilibrium of this kind, there are arguments why all players should choose it. If there are many such equilibria, one needs a commonly understood rule or convention for choosing one over the others. If there is no such equilibrium, that usually means that any systematic behavior can be exploited by one’s rivals, and therefore indicates the need for mixing one’s plays. In practice, games can have some sequential moves and some simultaneous moves; then a combination of these techniques must be employed to think about and determine one’s best choice of actions.
| 
加好友,备注jr
京公网安备 11010802022788号
论坛法律顾问：王进律师
知识产权保护声明
免责及隐私声明
发帖
雷达卡
