博弈论相关模型方法总结（完全信息博弈、非完全信息博弈）有例子计算说明

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博弈论也是社科论文的必备知识，由于学习论文需要，研读博弈论相关模型知识，对重要内容进行PPT总结，现整理压缩，希望给有需要的同学提供帮助。
博弈论内容总结，包括完全信息博弈，非完全信息博弈及相关模型，包括经典模型 博弈.rar (327.88 KB, 需要: RMB 18 元)

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博弈论相关模型知识总结，包括经典模型
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关键词：博弈 经典模型 完全信息博弈 非完全信息博弈

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楼主，问您一道题～
In a trust game, player 1 is given $10. She can send any fraction of that money to player 2. Player 1 keeps the remainder. Whatever money is sent to player 2 is tripled in the process (e.g. if $6 is sent by player 1, then player 2 receives $18). Player 2 then decides how much of the money she receives to return to player 1.
a. When both players maximize their monetary payoff, what is the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game? Explain why the equilibrium is Pareto inefficient.
b. Player 1 again maximizes his monetary payoff. But now suppose that player 2 can be
either a trustworthy type or untrustworthy type. Untrustworthy types maximize their
monetary payoff. But trustworthy types always return to player 1 double what player 1
sent. Suppose that player 1 believes that player 2 is a trustworthy type with probability
p.Showthatplayer1sends$10toplayer2ifp>1 andsendszeroifp<1.
c. Briefly, how could this explain why high trust countries have higher standards of living?