英文文献:Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability-婚姻市场的平衡,资格和能力
英文文献作者:Dan Anderberg,Jesper Bagger,V. Bhaskar,Tanya Wilson
英文文献摘要:
We study marital sorting on academic qualifications and latent ability in an equilibrium marriage market model using the 1972 UK Raising of the School-Leaving Age (RoSLA) legislation as a natural experiment that induced a sudden, large shift in the distribution of academic qualifications in affected cohorts, but plausibly had no impact on the distribution of ability. We show that a Choo and Siow (2006) model with sorting on cohort, qualifications, and latent ability is identified and estimable using the RoSLA-induced population shifts. We find that the RoSLA isolated low ability individuals in the marriage market, and affected marital outcomes of individuals whose qualification attainment were unaffected. We also decompose the difference in marriage probabilities between unqualified individuals and those with basic qualifications into causal effects stemming from ability and qualification differences. Differences in marriage probabilities are almost entirely driven by ability
我们研究婚姻排序在学历和潜在能力在婚姻市场均衡模型使用1972英国提高离校年龄(RoSLA)立法作为一个自然实验诱导突然大转变学历在受影响人群的分布,但似乎没有对能力的分布的影响。我们证明Choo和Siow(2006)模型与排序的队列,条件,和潜在能力是确定和可估计的使用roslai诱导的人口转移。我们发现,RoSLA隔离了婚姻市场中的低能力个体,并影响了未受其影响的个体的婚姻结果。我们还将不合格个体与基本资格个体之间的结婚概率差异分解为因能力和资格差异而产生的因果效应。结婚可能性的差异几乎完全是由能力决定的


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