英文文献:Market Power and Growth through Vertical and Horizontal Competition-市场力量和通过垂直和水平竞争的增长
英文文献作者:Gilad Sorek
英文文献摘要:
I study the implications of innovators' market power to growth and welfare in a two-R&D-sector economy. In this framework either vertical or horizontal competition is binding in the price setting stage, depending on the model parameters and the implemented market-power policy. I consider two alternative policies that are commonly, yet separately, used in the literature to constraint innovators' market power: patent lagging-breadth protection and direct price controls. I show that (a) the alternative policies may have non-monotonic and contradicting effects on growth (b) unconstrained market power may yields either excessive or insufficient growth compared with social optimum and (c) the social optimum can be achieved by reducing innovators market power with the proper policy instrument, along with a corresponding flat rate R&D-subsidy.
我研究了在一个双研发部门经济中,创新者的市场力量对增长和福利的影响。在这个框架下,根据模型参数和执行的市场力量政策,垂直或水平竞争在定价阶段都具有约束力。我考虑了两种通常在文献中单独使用来限制创新者市场力量的替代政策:专利滞后宽度保护和直接价格控制。我表明,(a)替代政策可能non-monotonic和矛盾对增长的影响(b)不受约束的市场力量可以产生过多或不足的增长与社会最优和(c)社会优化可以通过降低创新者与适当的政策工具,市场力量R&D-subsidy连同相应的平率。


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