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英文文献：Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions-买方联盟在WIC婴儿配方奶粉拍卖中的制衡力量
英文文献作者：Davis, David E.
英文文献摘要：
State WIC agencies in infant-formula procurement auctions receive lower bids and final prices when they are in buyer’s alliances than when they are unallied. The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) uses an auction to procure infant formula. Manufacturers bid on the right to be an agency’s sole supplier by offering a rebate on formula sold through WIC. A theoretical model of rebates shows that bidders may shade their bids and extract surplus from agencies. An empirical estimation shows that bids are lower to alliances suggesting that alliances countervail the power of bidders to extract surplus.
参与婴儿配方奶粉采购拍卖的州政府WIC机构，在与买家结盟时，获得的出价和最终价格都低于未结盟时。妇女、婴儿和儿童特别补充营养计划(WIC)通过拍卖获得婴儿配方奶粉。制造商通过对通过WIC销售的配方奶粉提供折扣，从而竞标成为代理商的独家供应商。回扣的一个理论模型表明，竞标者可能掩盖他们的出价，并从代理商那里榨取盈余。一个经验估计表明，投标低于联盟，表明联盟抵消了投标人的权力，以提取盈余。
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