全书免费下载：是谁杀死了雷曼：雷曼破产报告[阳民资料库2010年新书]

续8:
a. English Law Governs Contract Claims Arising from
the U.K. Cash Deeds...............................................................1339
b. English Contract Law Treats Deeds Differently from
Other Contracts .......................................................................1340
(ii) The Evidence Does Not Support the Existence of a
Colorable Claim That the U.K. Cash Deeds Are Invalid
for Want of Consideration..........................................................1341
(iii) The Evidence Does Not Support the Existence of a
Colorable Claim for Economic Duress Because the
CREST Agreement Allowed HSBC To Cease Clearing
and Settlement at Its Absolute Discretion................................1343
a. Elements of Economic Duress...............................................1343
b. Application to Lehman Facts ................................................1344
c. Other Transactions Do Not Give Rise to Economic
Duress Claims..........................................................................1346
(iv) The Evidence Does Not Support the Existence of a
Colorable Claim that HSBC Violated a Duty of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing by Demanding Cash Collateral .........1348
a. English Law Does Not Recognize a Principle of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing of General Application ..................1349
b. Application to Lehman Facts ................................................1349
(v) The Evidence Does Not Support the Existence of a
Colorable Claim that HSBC Violated the Notice
Provision of the CREST Agreement..........................................1352
a. Construction of Terms............................................................1352
b. Application to Lehman Facts ................................................1353
(vi) The Cash Deeds Were Not Contracts of Adhesion or
Standard Form Contracts............................................................1355
a. Characteristics of Standard Form Contracts or
Contracts of Adhesion............................................................1355
b. Application to Lehman Facts ................................................1355
(c) Other Potential Theories of Liability................................................1357
(i) English Law Governs the Remaining Potential Claims
Even Though They Are Not Covered by the Choice‐of‐
Law Provision of the Cash Deeds..............................................1357
a. Analytical Framework............................................................1357
b. Application to Remaining Potential Claims........................1359
(ii) The Evidence Does Not Support The Existence Of a
Colorable Claim For Unjust Enrichment Because
Lehman Conveyed a Benefit on HSBC Pursuant to
Lehman’s Valid Contractual Obligations.................................1360
a. Elements of Unjust Enrichment ............................................1361
b. Application to Lehman Facts ................................................1362
(iii) The Evidence Does Not Support a Colorable Claim That
HSBC Breached a Fiduciary Duty to Lehman Because
HSBC and Lehman Were Sophisticated Parties in a
Relationship Governed by an Agreement That Limited
HSBC’s Obligations .....................................................................1363
a. Elements of Breach of Fiduciary Duty and
Misappropriation ....................................................................1364
b. Application to Lehman Facts ................................................1365
(iv) The Evidence Does Not Support a Colorable Claim that
HSBC’s Demand for Collateral Tortiously Interfered
With Lehman’s Other Business or Contracts Because
HSBC Was Acting To Protect Its Own Economic
Interests .........................................................................................1367
a. Elements of Tortious Interference ........................................1368
b. Application to Lehman Facts ................................................1369
(v) The Evidence Does Not Support a Finding that HSBC
Fraudulently or Negligently Misrepresented Its Plan to
Withdraw ......................................................................................1371
a. Elements of Fraud and Misrepresentation ..........................1371
b. Application to Lehman Facts ................................................1373
e) Lehman’s Dealings With Bank of America .................................................1375
f) Lehman’s Dealings with Bank of New York Mellon .................................1376
(1) BNYM Demands and Receives a Collateral Deposit ...........................1377
(2) The Deposit Is Significant Because of Internal Lehman Concerns
About Including It in Its Pool..................................................................1379
g) Lehman’s Dealings With Standard Bank.....................................................1382
h) Lehman’s Dealings With the Federal Reserve Bank of New York ..........1385
(1) The FRBNY Supervises Deposit‐Taking Institutions and Assists
in Managing Monetary Policy, but Lacks Authority To Regulate
Investment Bank Holding Companies...................................................1385
(2) In Response to the Bear Stearns Near Collapse, the FRBNY
Created a Variety of Facilities To Backstop the Liquidity of
Broker‐Dealers; Lehman, In Turn, Drew on These Facilities..............1387
(a) The Primary Dealer Credit Facility ..................................................1387
(b) The Market Greeted the Creation of the PDCF as a Positive
Step Toward Backstopping Broker‐Dealer Liquidity, and as
Shoring Up Lehman’s Liquidity .......................................................1390
(c) In Addition to a Liquidity Backstop, Lehman Viewed the
PDCF as an Outlet for Its Illiquid Positions ....................................1392
(d) Lehman Was Reluctant to Draw on the PDCF Because of a
Perceived “Stigma” Attached to Borrowing from the Facility.....1396
(e) Lehman Accessed the PDCF Ten Times in 2008; Lehman’s
Use of the PDCF Was Concentrated in Periods Immediately
After the Bear Stearns Near Collapse, and Immediately After
LBHI Filed for Bankruptcy ................................................................1398
(3) Other FRBNY Liquidity Facilities ...........................................................1400
(a) The Term Secured Lending Facility .................................................1400
(b) Open Markets Operations..................................................................1401
i) Lehman’s Liquidity Pool................................................................................1401
(1) Introduction and Executive Summary...................................................1401
(2) The Importance of Liquidity to Broker‐Dealers and Investment
Bank Holding Companies Generally .....................................................1406
(3) Lehman’s Liquidity Pool..........................................................................1408
(a) The Purpose and Composition of Lehman’s Liquidity Pool ........1408
(b) Lehman Tested Its Liquidity Pool and Shared the Results of
These Tests with Rating Agencies ....................................................1413
(c) Market Participants Formed Favorable Opinions of
Lehman’s Liquidity on the Basis of Lehman’s
Representations About Its Liquidity Pool .......................................1415
(4) Lehman’s Clearing Banks Sought Collateral Pledges and Cash
Deposits To Secure Intraday Credit Risk; Lehman Included This
Collateral in Its Liquidity Pool................................................................1417
(a) Lehman Pledged CLOs and Other Securities to JPMorgan
Throughout the Summer of 2008 to Meet Triparty‐Repo
Margin Requirements.........................................................................1417
(b) The Securities Posted to Meet JPMorgan’s Margin
Requirements Were Included in Lehman’s Liquidity Pool ..........1422
(c) On June 12, 2008, Lehman Transferred $2 Billion to Citi as
“Comfort” for Continuing CLS Settlement .....................................1424
(d) The Citi “Comfort Deposit” Was Included in Lehman’s
Liquidity Pool ......................................................................................1430
(e) On August 25, 2008, Lehman Executed a Security Agreement
with Bank of America, Granting the Bank a Security Interest
in a $500 Million Deposit ...................................................................1433
(f) LBHI and JPMorgan Executed an Amendment to the June
2000 Clearance Agreement, a Security Agreement and a
Holding Company Guaranty, all Dated August 26, 2008 .............1436
(g) Lehman Assets Subject to the August Security Agreement
Were Included in Lehman’s Liquidity Pool....................................1439
(h) September 2, 2008: Lehman Transferred Just Under $1 Billion
to HSBC to Continue Clearing Operations, and Encumbered
This with “Cash Deeds” Executed on September 9 and
September 12........................................................................................1441
(i) The HSBC Deposit Was Represented as “Liquid” and Was
Included in LBHI’s Liquidity Pool ...................................................1446
(j) Lehman and JPMorgan Executed Another Round of Security
Documentation Dated September 9, 2008; Lehman Made $3.6
Billion and $5 Billion Pledges to JPMorgan Subject to the
Terms of These Agreements..............................................................1446
(k) Lehman Made a Deposit to Bank of New York Mellon to
Cover Intraday Exposure, and Included That Deposit in Its
Liquidity Pool ......................................................................................1448
(l) The Cumulative Impact of Lehman’s Inclusion of Clearing‐
Bank Collateral and Deposits in Its Liquidity Pool........................1450

续9:
(5) Disclosures Concerning the Inclusion of Clearing‐Bank
Collateral in Lehman’s Liquidity Pool...................................................1454
(a) Lehman Did Not Disclose on Its June 16, 2008 Second
Quarter Earnings Call That It Was Including the $2 Billion
Citi “Comfort Deposit” in Its Liquidity Pool..................................1454
(b) Lehman Did Not Disclose in Its Second Quarter 2008 10‐Q,
Filed July 10, 2008, That It Was Including Both the $2 Billion
Citibank “Comfort Deposit” and Approximately $5.5 Billion
of Securities Collateral Pledged to JPMorgan in Its Liquidity
Pool........................................................................................................1455
(c) Lehman Did Not Disclose On Its September 10, 2008
Earnings Call That a Substantial Portion of Its Liquidity Pool
Was Encumbered by Clearing‐Bank Pledges .................................1457
(d) Senior Executives Did Not Disclose to the Board of Directors
at the September 9, 2008 Finance Committee Meeting the
Fact That a Substantial Portion of Its Liquidity Pool Was
Encumbered by Clearing‐Bank Pledges ..........................................1460
(e) Lehman Officers Did Not Disclose to the Board of Directors
That Its Liquidity Position Was Substantially Impaired by
Collateral Held at Clearing Banks Until the Evening of
September 14, 2008..............................................................................1464
(f) Lowitt’s Views on Including Clearing‐Bank Collateral in the
Liquidity Pool ......................................................................................1466
(6) Rating Agencies Were Unaware That Lehman Was Including
Clearing‐Bank Collateral in Its Liquidity Pool .....................................1467
(a) Fitch.......................................................................................................1467
(b) Standard & Poor’s ...............................................................................1468
(c) Moody’s................................................................................................1469
(7) The FRBNY Did Not View the Clearing‐Bank Collateral in the
Liquidity Pool as “Unencumbered”.......................................................1469
(8) The SEC, Lehman’s Primary Regulator, Was Unaware of the
Extent to Which Lehman Was Including Clearing‐Bank
Collateral in Its Liquidity Pool; to the Extent It Was Aware, the
SEC Did Not View This Practice as Proper...........................................1472
(9) Certain Lehman Counsel Were Aware That Agreements with Its
Clearing Banks Were Structured to Include Clearing‐Bank
Collateral in Its Liquidity Pool, but Disclaimed Knowledge
Concerning What Assets Were Appropriate or Inappropriate for
the Liquidity Pool .....................................................................................1476
(10) Lehman’s Auditors Monitored Lehman’s Liquidity Pool, but
Viewed the Composition of the Pool as a Regulatory Issue...............1478
(11) There Is Insufficient Evidence To Support a Determination
That Any Officer or Director Breached a Fiduciary Duty in
Connection With the Public Disclosure of Lehman’s Liquidity
Pool..............................................................................................................1479
VOLUME 4 (CONT.)
Section III.A.6: Government
6. The Interaction Between Lehman and the Government .................................1482
a) Introduction .....................................................................................................1482
b) The SEC’s Oversight of Lehman...................................................................1484
(1) The CSE Program......................................................................................1484
(2) Lehman’s Participation in the CSE Program ........................................1487
(3) The SEC/OIG Findings .............................................................................1490
(4) The View From the Top ...........................................................................1492
c) The FRBNY’s Oversight of Lehman.............................................................1494
d) The Federal Reserve’s Oversight of Lehman ..............................................1502
e) The Treasury Department’s Oversight of Lehman....................................1505
f) The Relationship of the SEC and FRBNY in Monitoring Lehman’s
Liquidity...........................................................................................................1507
(1) The SEC Performed Only Limited Monitoring of Lehman’s
Liquidity Pool ............................................................................................1508
(2) The SEC and FRBNY Did Not Always Share Information About
Lehman.......................................................................................................1511
g) The Government’s Preparation for the “Lehman Weekend”
Meetings at the FRBNY..................................................................................1516
h) On the Evening of Friday, September 12, 2008, the Government
Convened a Meeting of the Major Wall Street Firms in an Attempt
to Facilitate the Rescue of Lehman...............................................................1523
i) Lehman’s Bankruptcy Filing .........................................................................1535
VOLUME 5
Section III.B: Avoidance Actions
B. Are There Administrative Claims or Colorable Claims for Preferences or
Voidable Transfers......................................................................................................1544
1. Executive Summary..............................................................................................1544
2. Examiner’s Investigation of Possible Administrative Claims Against
LBHI (First Bullet).................................................................................................1546
a) Summary..........................................................................................................1546
b) Introduction .....................................................................................................1547
c) Lehman’s Cash Management System ..........................................................1549
(1) LBHI’s Role as Central Banker................................................................1550
(2) Global Cash and Collateral Management .............................................1551
(3) Lehman’s External and Virtual Bank Accounts....................................1554
(4) Bank Account Reconciliations.................................................................1560
d) Effect of the Bankruptcy on the Cash Management System.....................1562
e) Cash Transfers Giving Rise to Administrative Claims..............................1564
(1) Cash Transfers from LBHI Affiliates to LBHI.......................................1565
(2) Cash Received by LBHI on Behalf of LBHI Affiliates..........................1566
(3) Other Relevant Transactions ...................................................................1568
3. Examiner’s Investigation of Possible Avoidance Actions (Third, Fourth
and Eighth Bullets)................................................................................................1570
a) Summary..........................................................................................................1570
b) LBHI Solvency Analysis.................................................................................1570
(1) Introduction ...............................................................................................1570
(2) Market‐Based Valuation Analysis ..........................................................1573
(a) Basis for Utilization of a Market‐Based Valuation Analysis.........1573
(b) Market Value of Assets Approach....................................................1577
(i) Implied Asset Value ....................................................................1578
(ii) Small Equity Cushion..................................................................1580
(iii) Limitations of the Market‐Based Approach.............................1581
a. Application of Retrojection....................................................1583
b. The Application of “Current Awareness”...........................1584
(3) Conclusion .................................................................................................1587
c) LBHI Affiliate Solvency Analysis .................................................................1587
(1) Summary....................................................................................................1587
(2) Description of the Examiner’s Analysis.................................................1595
(3) Debtor‐by‐Debtor Analysis .....................................................................1610
(a) Lehman Commercial Paper Inc.........................................................1610
(b) CES Aviation, CES Aviation V LLC, CES Aviation IX ..................1615
(c) LB Special Financing...........................................................................1618
(d) LB Commodity Services.....................................................................1622
(e) Luxembourg Residential Properties Loan Finance S.A.R.L..........1627
(f) LB OTC Derivatives............................................................................1628
(g) LB 745 LLC...........................................................................................1629
(h) LB Derivative Products ......................................................................1631

续10:
(i) LB Financial Products.........................................................................1633
(j) LB Commercial Corporation .............................................................1635
(k) BNC Mortgage LLC............................................................................1638
(l) East Dover Limited .............................................................................1638
(m) Lehman Scottish Finance ..................................................................1640
(n) PAMI Statler Arms..............................................................................1641
d) Unreasonably Small Capital..........................................................................1642
(1) Summary....................................................................................................1645
(2) Analysis of the “Unreasonably Small Capital” Test ............................1648
(a) Summary of Legal Standard..............................................................1648
(b) Lehman’s Countercyclical Strategy..................................................1650
(c) Lehman’s Repo Book and Liquidity Risk........................................1654
(i) Bear Stearns Demonstrates the Liquidity Risk Associated
With Repo Financing...................................................................1656

(ii) Quality and Tenor of Lehman’s Repo Book.............................1658
(d) Deleveraging to “Win Back” Market Confidence ..........................1662
(e) Beginning in the Third Quarter of 2008, Lehman Could Have
Reasonably Anticipated a Loss of Confidence Which Would
Have Triggered Its Liquidity Risk....................................................1665
(f) Lehman Was Not Sufficiently Prepared to Absorb a
Liquidity Crisis Marked by a Sudden Loss of Non‐
Government, Non‐Agency Repo Funding ......................................1674
(i) Lehman’s Liquidity Pool ............................................................1675
(ii) Liquidity Stress Tests ..................................................................1678
(iii) Other Capital Adequacy Metrics...............................................1687
a. Cash Capital Surplus ..............................................................1687
b. Equity Adequacy Framework...............................................1688
c. CSE Capital Ratio....................................................................1690
(g) LBHI Affiliate “Unreasonably Small Capital” Analysis................1692
e) Insider Preferences Against LBHI (Third Bullet) .......................................1694
(1) Summary....................................................................................................1694
(2) Legal Summary .........................................................................................1696
(3) Sources of Potential Preferential Activity..............................................1698
(4) Determinations and Assumptions on Section 547(b) Elements .........1705
(5) Scope of Defenses Under Section 547(c) ................................................1710
(6) Findings for LBSF......................................................................................1713
(7) Findings for LBCS.....................................................................................1718
(8) Findings for LCPI......................................................................................1722
f) Preferences Against Non‐LBHI Lehman Affiliates (Fourth Bullet).........1730
g) Avoidance Analysis of LBHI and LBHI Affiliates Against Financial
Participants and Pre‐Chapter 11 Lenders (Fourth and Eighth
Bullets) ..............................................................................................................1731
(1) Summary....................................................................................................1731
(2) APB Analysis .............................................................................................1734
(3) Cash Disbursement Analysis ..................................................................1737
(4) Pledged Collateral Accounts Analysis...................................................1738
(5) Avoidance Analysis for Certain Pre‐Chapter 11 Lenders and
Financial Participants ...............................................................................1739
(a) JPMorgan Avoidance Analysis .........................................................1739
(i) Background...................................................................................1739
(ii) Avoidability of the September Agreements and
Transfers in Connection with the September Agreements....1742
a. Avoidability of the September Guaranty as a
Constructive Fraudulent Obligation ....................................1743
1. There Is Evidence To Support A Finding That
LBHI Incurred an Obligation Within the
Applicable Look‐Back Periods When it Executed
the September Guaranty ..................................................1743
2. There Is Evidence To Support A Finding That
LBHI Received Less Than Reasonably Equivalent
Value or Did Not Receive Fair Consideration in
Exchange for Granting JPMorgan the September
Guaranty.............................................................................1744
3. Insolvency as of September 10, 2008 ..............................1757
4. Undercapitalization as of September 10, 2008 ..............1758
b. Defenses to Avoidability of the September Guaranty.......1758
1. Applicability of the Good Faith Defense of Section
548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code and Section 279 of
the N.Y. Debtor Creditor Law to the September
Guaranty.............................................................................1758
2. Applicability of the Safe‐Harbor Provisions to the
September Guaranty.........................................................1762
c. Avoidability of Transfers of Collateral in Connection
with the September Guaranty ...............................................1767
1. LBHI’s Collateral Transfers and Post‐Petition
Setoffs..................................................................................1767
2. Application Of The Safe Harbors To The $8.6
Billion Cash Collateral Transfers ....................................1776
3. There Is Evidence To Support Potential State Law
Claims Available to LBHI Pursuant to Section 541
to Avoid the Transfers In Connection with the
September Guaranty.........................................................1781
4. To the Extent the September Guaranty Provided
for a Guaranty of Non‐Protected Contract
Obligations, Or to the Extent JPMorgan
Liquidated Collateral Pursuant to Non‐Protected
Contract Exposure, a Colorable Basis Exists that
the Safe‐Harbor Provisions are not Applicable ............1787
(iii) Avoidability of the August Agreements and Transfers in
Connection with the August Agreements................................1794
a. Avoidability of the August Guaranty as a
Constructive Fraudulent Obligation ....................................1794
1. LBHI Incurred an Obligation Within the
Applicable Look‐Back Periods When it Executed
the August Guaranty........................................................1794
2. There Is Evidence That LBHI Received Less Than
Reasonably Equivalent Value or Did Not Receive
Fair Consideration in Exchange for Granting
JPMorgan the August Guaranty .....................................1795
3. Insolvency as of August 29, 2008....................................1797
4. Undercapitalization and Inability to Pay Debts as
They Come Due as of August 29, 2008 ..........................1797
b. Defenses to Avoidability of the August Guaranty.............1797
c. Avoidability of Transfers of Collateral in Connection
With the August Guaranty ....................................................1798
(iv) Avoidability of the August and the September Security
Agreements And Collateral Transfers Pursuant to
Section 548(a)(1)(A) .....................................................................1801
(v) Avoidability of the Transfers of Collateral in Connection
with the September Guaranty Pursuant to Section 547(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code ..............................................................1806
(vi) Avoidability of Obligations of LBHI to Funds Managed
by JPMorgan.................................................................................1813
(b) Citi Avoidance Analysis ....................................................................1817
(i) Background...................................................................................1817
(ii) Avoidability of the $2 Billion Deposit ......................................1821
(iii) Avoidability of the Amended Guaranty ..................................1821
(iv) Avoidability of the $500 Million Transfer From an LBHI
Account to an LBI Account ........................................................1827

续11:
(c) FRBNY Avoidance Analysis..............................................................1829
(d) HSBC Avoidance Analysis ................................................................1830
(i) Background...................................................................................1830
(ii) The U.K. Cash Deed Transactions.............................................1832
(iii) The Hong Kong Cash Deposit Transactions............................1833
(iv) September 9, 2009 Stipulation ....................................................1834
(v) Avoidability of the January 4, 2008 Guaranty .........................1835
(vi) Avoidability of the Hong Kong Cash Deed Transactions......1836
(vii) Avoidability of the U.K. Cash Deed.........................................1836
(viii) Avoidability of the Transfer of the Remaining
Collateral .......................................................................................1837
(e) Standard Bank Avoidance Analysis.................................................1837
(f) BNYM Avoidance Analysis...............................................................1839
(g) BofA Avoidance Analysis..................................................................1840
(h) CME Avoidance Analysis..................................................................1841
(i) Summary.......................................................................................1841
(ii) Background...................................................................................1843
a. Energy Derivatives .................................................................1851
b. FX Derivatives .........................................................................1852
c. Interest Rate Derivatives........................................................1852
d. Equity Derivatives ..................................................................1853
e. Agricultural Derivatives ........................................................1854
(iii) Defenses to Avoidability of Claims...........................................1855
a. Applicability of CEA Preemption.........................................1855
b. Applicability of Self‐Regulatory Organization
Immunity..................................................................................1862
c. Applicability of the Safe Harbor Provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code ....................................................................1870
h) Avoidance Analysis of LBHI Affiliate Payments to Insider
Employees (Fourth Bullet).............................................................................1871
(1) Summary....................................................................................................1871
(2) Methodology..............................................................................................1873
(3) Applicable Legal Standards.....................................................................1874
(4) Findings......................................................................................................1882
(a) LBHI Affiliate Severance Payments .................................................1882
(b) LBHI Affiliate Bonus Payments........................................................1887
(c) LBHI’s Assumptions of Limited Partnership Interests..................1889
4. Examiner’s Investigation of Possible Breaches of Fiduciary Duty by
LBHI Affiliate Directors and Officers (Fifth Bullet) .........................................1894
a) Fiduciary Duty Standard for a Wholly‐Owned Affiliate Subsidiary
under Delaware Law......................................................................................1896
b) Fiduciary Duty Standard for a Wholly‐Owned Affiliate Subsidiary
under New York Law.....................................................................................1902
(1) LCPI’s Background and Officers and Directors ..................................1905
(a) Duty of Care.........................................................................................1907
(b) Duty to Monitor ..................................................................................1909
c) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Aiding or Abetting Under Delaware
Law....................................................................................................................1911
5. Examiner’s Analysis of Lehman’s Foreign Exchange Transactions
(Second Bullet).......................................................................................................1912
a) Summary..........................................................................................................1912
b) Foreign Exchange at Lehman........................................................................1913
c) Foreign Exchange Transactions During the Stub Period ..........................1923
6. Examiner’s Review of Intercompany Transactions Within Thirty Days
of LBHI’s Bankruptcy Filing (Seventh Bullet) ..................................................1938
a) Summary..........................................................................................................1938
b) Discussion ........................................................................................................1939
c) Analysis ............................................................................................................1942
d) Analysis of Overall Net Intercompany Data for the 2007 and 2008
Periods of Analysis .........................................................................................1942
(1) LBHI............................................................................................................1942
(2) LBIE.............................................................................................................1945
(3) LBSF ............................................................................................................1947
e) Analysis of Net Daily Intercompany Data for the 2007 and 2008
Periods of Analysis .........................................................................................1949
7. Examiner’s Analysis of Lehman’s Debt to Freddie Mac .................................1951
VOLUME 5 (CONT.)
Section III.C: Barclays Transaction
C. Do Colorable Claims Arise From Transfers of LBHI Affiliate Assets to
Barclays, or From the Lehman ALI Transaction?...................................................1961
1. Executive Summary..............................................................................................1961
a) Purpose of Investigation ................................................................................1961
(1) Barclays Sale Transaction.........................................................................1961
(2) Lehman ALI Transaction .........................................................................1963
b) Summary of Conclusions...............................................................................1963
(1) Barclays Transaction.................................................................................1963
(2) Lehman ALI Transaction .........................................................................1965
2. Facts.........................................................................................................................1965
a) Lehman Businesses and Assets.....................................................................1965
(1) LBHI Affiliate Operating Companies ....................................................1970
(a) LBCS......................................................................................................1970
(b) LBCC.....................................................................................................1972
(c) LCPI ......................................................................................................1975
(d) LBSF ......................................................................................................1978
(e) LOTC.....................................................................................................1980
(f) LBDP and LBFP...................................................................................1981
(g) LBF ........................................................................................................1984
(h) BNC.......................................................................................................1986
(2) LBHI Affiliate Single Purpose Entities...................................................1987
(a) LB 745....................................................................................................1987
(b) CES Aviation Entities .........................................................................1987
(c) PAMI Statler ........................................................................................1988
(d) East Dover............................................................................................1988
(e) Scottish Finance...................................................................................1989
(f) Luxembourg S.A.R.L. .........................................................................1989
(g) Navigator .............................................................................................1990
(3) Sale Transaction.........................................................................................1991
(未完待续)

太感谢楼主了，希望楼主有中文版的时候也发上来。

续12:


3. Whether Assets of LBHI Affiliates Were Transferred to Barclays.................1997
a) Analysis of Securities Transferred to Barclays ...........................................1998
(1) Securities Transferred to Barclays ..........................................................1999
(a) Lehman’s Securities Trading Records and Systems ......................2005
(i) General ..........................................................................................2005
(ii) GFS System Assessment .............................................................2008
a. Comparison of GFS Data to Lehman’s 10‐Q Filings ..........2009
b. Comparison of GFS Data to Lehman’s General Ledger....2009
c. Reliability of September 12 Data...........................................2010

(iii) GFS Data Extracted by Examiner ..............................................2010
(2) Analysis of GFS Data................................................................................2012
(a) CUSIPs Not Associated With LBHI Affiliate Entities....................2014
(b) CUSIPs Associated Solely With an LBHI Affiliate Entity .............2015

(c) CUSIPs Associated With Both LBI and LBHI Affiliate
Entities ..................................................................................................2016
(i) CUSIPs Associated With Subordinated Entities .....................2016
(ii) Securities Financing Transactions .............................................2021
(iii) Alternative Analyses ...................................................................2024
(d) 817 CUSIPs With No GFS Data.........................................................2025
(i) September 19, 2008 GFS Dataset................................................2026
(ii) Search by ISIN Number and Product ID..................................2027

(iii) TMS Source System .....................................................................2027
(iv) Additional Data Sources.............................................................2028
b) Analysis of Tangible Asset Transfers...........................................................2030
(1) LB 745..........................................................................................................2033
(2) LBCS............................................................................................................2035
(3) LCPI ............................................................................................................2036
(4) LBSF ............................................................................................................2038
(5) CES ..............................................................................................................2039
(6) CES V ..........................................................................................................2041
(7) CES IX .........................................................................................................2042
c) Analysis of Intangible Asset Transfers ........................................................2044
(1) Customer Information Assets .................................................................2045
(2) Proprietary Software ................................................................................2051
(3) Assembled Workforce ..............................................................................2054
4. Lehman ALI Transaction .....................................................................................2055
5. Conclusions............................................................................................................2063
a) Summary..........................................................................................................2063
b) Colorable Claims Arising from Transfer of LBHI Assets..........................2064
(1) There Are No Colorable Claims Against Barclays Arising from
Transfer of LBHI Affiliate Securities ......................................................2064
(2) There Are Colorable, Limited Claims Against Barclays Arising
from Transfer of LBHI Affiliate Office Equipment and LBCS
Customer Information..............................................................................2076
(a) Bankruptcy Code Claims ...................................................................2077
(i) Section 542.....................................................................................2077
(ii) Section 548.....................................................................................2081
(b) Common Law Claims.........................................................................2083
(i) Recovery of Chattel .....................................................................2083
(ii) Conversion....................................................................................2086
(iii) Unjust Enrichment.......................................................................2088
(iv) Trade Secret Misappropriation..................................................2090
(v) Unfair Competition .....................................................................2092
(vi) Tortious Interference With Employment Relations................2094
(3) Claims Against LBHI Affiliate Officers and Directors ........................2096
(a) Duty of Care.........................................................................................2098
(b) Duty of Good Faith .............................................................................2100
(c) Duty to Monitor ..................................................................................2101
c) Lehman ALI Transaction ...............................................................................2103
6. Barclays Transaction.............................................................................................2103
a) Pre‐Bankruptcy Negotiations........................................................................2104
(1) Barclays’ Interest in a Transaction Involving Lehman........................2104
(2) Negotiations Before September 15 .........................................................2110
b) LBHI Bankruptcy ............................................................................................2116
(1) LBHI Files Chapter 11 ..............................................................................2116
(2) Post‐Petition Clearing and Financing ....................................................2116
c) Negotiations Leading to APA.......................................................................2124
(1) Participants ................................................................................................2127
(2) Structure of Transaction...........................................................................2129
(3) Negotiations Regarding Securities Positions to be Purchased by
Barclays.......................................................................................................2131
(a) On September 15 and 16, Lehman and Barclays Review
Lehman’s Securities Positions and Marks.......................................2131
(b) Barclays Agrees to Purchase “Long” Securities Positions
With a Book Value of “Approximately $70 Billion” ......................2138
(4) Negotiations Regarding Contract Cure and Employee
Compensation Liabilities .........................................................................2143
(a) Contract Cure Costs............................................................................2143
(b) Compensation Liabilities ...................................................................2147
d) Consideration and Approval of Transaction Described in APA by
LBHI and LBI Boards of Directors................................................................2153
e) Transaction Described to the Court on September 17 ...............................2155
(1) Sale Motion ................................................................................................2155
(2) September 17 Sale Procedures Hearing.................................................2157
f) Between September 17 and 19, the Securities Positions Being
Acquired by Barclays Change.......................................................................2160
(1) The “Replacement Transaction” .............................................................2160
(2) $15.8 Billion Repo......................................................................................2170
(3) September 19 Agreement to Transfer Additional Assets....................2175
(a) Excess 15c3‐3 Assets ...........................................................................2178
(b) Additional Securities ..........................................................................2182
(c) OCC Margin.........................................................................................2184
g) The Court’s Consideration and Approval of the Proposed
Transaction.......................................................................................................2188
(1) September 19, 2008 Sale Hearing............................................................2188
(2) The Sale Order...........................................................................................2192
h) Transaction Closing ........................................................................................2194
(1) JPMorgan/Barclays Disputes...................................................................2194
(2) The Committee’s Role ..............................................................................2197
(3) December 2008 Settlement Between Trustee, Barclays and
JPMorgan....................................................................................................2208
(目录全部结束)

tomylou 发表于 2010-3-20 23:12
太感谢楼主了，希望楼主有中文版的时候也发上来。

我们近期会作出中文的解读来，也欢迎你给出你的解读!

This is great, thanks for your kind sharing!

谢谢，下载了学习一下

好东西，谢谢分享!