Optimal Contracts to Induce Biomass Production under Risk-在风险下诱导生物量生产的最佳合同

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英文文献：Optimal Contracts to Induce Biomass Production under Risk-在风险下诱导生物量生产的最佳合同
英文文献作者：Yang, Xi,Paulson, Nicholas D.,Khanna, Madhu
英文文献摘要：
There is growing interest in biomass from perennial grasses (e.g. switchgrass and miscanthus) for bioenergy production because of their high yields, their potential to be grown on low quality land with minimal competition with food crops and, and their ability to achieve significant reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions relative to fossil fuels and corn ethanol. In order to guarantee the steady supply of biomass feedstock for mandated biofuel production, a crucial question confronting the biorefinery and policy makers is how to coordinate a market for biomass production. This paper addresses this issue by analyzing the potential design of biomass production contracts between biomass growers and biorefineries to promote the development of the industry. We approach the issue from both the landowner and biorefinery perspectives. We analyze and examine how the optimal contract design depends on both the farmers’ and biorefinery’s characteristics. We also contribute to the existing literature examining the role of risks in contract design by how the risks from multiple sources interact and jointly determine the optimal contract terms. Our preliminary findings suggest that farmers’ land allocation decisions depend on the joint distribution of their individual land quality and risk preferences. For a given level of risk aversion, farmers with low land quality are more willing to sign contracts with biorefineries to produce bioenergy crops due to the low opportunity cost of foregoing row crop production. For a given land quality, the farmer’s choice of biomass contract design varies with their level of risk aversion. More risk averse farmers prefer the fixed lease design to avoid exposure to yield and price risk. As the level of risk aversion is reduced, preferences shift towards the fixed price and profit sharing contract designs since they can gain higher payoff in exchange for the higher risks they are bearing. For reasonable ranges of land quality levels and heterogeneity of risk aversion levels, the optimal solution for the biorefinery tends to include offering of multiple contract designs to producers in the region. The biorefinery can induce highest participation and obtain highest profit in a region with higher concentrations of low land quality. Furthermore, greater profits can be obtained by establishing a processing plant in an area where farmers have low risk aversion.

越来越多的兴趣从多年生牧草生物量(如柳枝稷和芒草)生物能源生产,因为他们的高收益率,他们可能在低质量的土地上种植以最少的与粮食作物的竞争,和他们的能力,以达到显著减少温室气体(GHG)排放相对于化石燃料和玉米乙醇。为了保证规定的生物燃料生产所需的生物质原料的稳定供应，生物精炼厂和决策者面临的一个关键问题是如何协调生物质生产的市场。本文通过分析生物质种植者和生物精炼厂之间的生物质生产合同的潜在设计来解决这一问题，以促进该行业的发展。我们从土地所有者和生物精炼的角度来处理这个问题。分析和研究了最优合同设计如何同时依赖于农户和生物精炼厂的特性。我们还对现有文献的研究做出了贡献，通过研究风险在合同设计中的作用，多种来源的风险如何相互作用并共同决定最优合同条款。我们的初步研究结果表明，农民的土地配置决策取决于他们各自土地质量和风险偏好的共同分布。在风险规避程度一定的情况下，土地质量较低的农民更愿意与生物精炼厂签订合同，生产生物能源作物，因为前述作物种植的机会成本较低。对于给定的土地质量，农民对生物质合同设计的选择随他们的风险厌恶程度而变化。风险厌恶型农户更倾向于采用固定租赁设计，以规避收益和价格风险。随着风险厌恶程度的降低，偏好转向固定价格和利润分享的合同设计，因为他们可以获得更高的回报，以换取更高的风险，他们承担。对于土地质量水平的合理范围和风险规避水平的异质性，生物精炼厂的最佳解决方案往往包括向该地区的生产者提供多种合同设计。在土地质量较低的地区，生物精炼厂可以吸引最高的参与率，并获得最高的利润。此外，在农民风险厌恶程度较低的地区建立加工厂，可以获得更大的利润。

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