劳动力市场冲击与贸易保护需求:在线调查的证据
LABOR MARKET SHOCKS AND THE DEMAND FOR TRADE PROTECTION: EVIDENCEFROM ONLINE SURVEYS
作者:
拉斐尔·迪·泰拉(Rafael Di Tella)
丹妮·罗德里克(Dani Rodrik)
We study preferences for government action in response to layoffs resulting from different typesof labor-market shocks. We consider the following shocks: technological change, a demand shift,bad management, and three kinds of international outsourcing. Respondents are given a choiceamong no government action, compensatory transfers, and trade protection. In response to theseshocks, support for government intervention generally rises sharply and is heavily biased towardstrade protection. Demand for import protection increases significantly in all cases, except for the“bad management” shock. Trade shocks generate more demand for protectionism, and amongtrade shocks, outsourcing to a developing country elicits greater demand for protectionism thanoutsourcing to a developed country. The “bad management” shock is the only scenario thatinduces a desired increase in compensatory transfers. Effects appear to be heterogeneous acrosssubgroups with different political preferences and education. Trump supporters are moreprotectionist than Clinton supporters, but preferences seem easy to manipulate: Clintonsupporters primed with trade shocks are as protectionist as baseline Trump voters. Highlightinglabor abuses in the exporting country increases the demand for trade protection by Clintonsupporters but not Trump supporters.我们研究了针对因不同类型的劳动力市场冲击而导致的裁员而采取政府行动的偏好。我们考虑以下冲击:技术变革,需求转移,管理不善和三种国际外包。受访者可以选择不采取政府行动,补偿性转移和贸易保护。为了应对这些冲击,对政府干预的支持通常会急剧增加,并严重偏向贸易保护。除“管理不善”冲击外,在所有情况下,对进口保护的需求均显着增加。贸易冲击产生了更多的贸易保护主义需求,而在贸易冲击中,与向发达国家进行外包相比,外包给发展中国家对保护主义的需求更大。“管理不善”的冲击是唯一导致期望的补偿性转移增加的情况。在政治偏好和教育程度不同的子群体之间,效果似乎是异质的。特朗普的支持者比克林顿的支持者更为保护主义,但偏好似乎易于操纵:贸易冲击引发的克林顿的支持者与特朗普的基线选民一样具有保护主义。在出口国强调劳工滥用会增加克林顿支持者而不是特朗普支持者对贸易保护的需求。受到贸易冲击冲击的克林顿支持者与基线特朗普选民一样具有保护主义。在出口国强调劳工滥用会增加克林顿支持者而不是特朗普支持者对贸易保护的需求。受到贸易冲击冲击的克林顿支持者与基线特朗普选民一样具有保护主义。在出口国强调劳工滥用会增加克林顿支持者而不是特朗普支持者对贸易保护的需求。