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英文文献：Agency costs, vertical integration and ownership structure: the case of wine business in France-代理成本、垂直整合与所有权结构:法国葡萄酒行业的案例
英文文献作者：Cadot, Julien
英文文献摘要：
French Wine Business raises specific questions on organizational forms. Indeed, the pervasiveness of specific organizational forms such as family-controlled firms and cooperatives and the diversity of vertical integration strategies stress the question of agency costs and their effects on performance. In this paper, we use the Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) methodology to measure agency costs according to governance structure and vertical integration on a sample of 180 wine firms. The econometric analysis displays highly significant results which let think that (i) family-controlled firms may be subject to agency problems partly solved by the “outside equity” discipline, (ii) agency costs are not significantly higher for cooperative firms than for family-controlled firms, (iii) operating expenses increase with vertical integration for non-cooperative firms. One striking result is that contrary to non-cooperative firms, performance does not increase with vertical integration for cooperatives while agency costs remain low albeit vertical integration. One explanation is that agency costs may be seen as necessary expenses for success of vertical integration and cooperatives may not fill this requirement.
法国葡萄酒行业提出了关于组织形式的具体问题。的确，诸如家族控制的公司和合作社等具体组织形式的普遍存在以及纵向一体化战略的多样性都强调了代理成本及其对业绩的影响的问题。在本文中，我们使用Ang, Cole和Lin(2000)的方法，以180家葡萄酒公司为样本，根据治理结构和垂直整合来衡量代理成本。计量经济分析显示非常重要的结果,我们认为(i)家族企业可能受代理问题在一定程度上解决了“外部股权”纪律,(ii)合作企业代理成本不显著高于对家族企业,(iii)营业费用增加非合作公司的垂直整合。一个显著的结果是，与非合作性企业相反，对合作社来说，纵向一体化并不会增加绩效，而代理成本虽然是纵向一体化，但仍然很低。一种解释是，代理成本可能被视为纵向一体化成功的必要费用，而合作社可能无法满足这一要求。
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