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lily_merry 发表于 2010-4-30 15:17:31 |AI写论文

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Land Economics 85(1):144-161 (2009);
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Articles by Chang, H.-H.
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Distinguishing between Whole-Farm vs. Partial-Farm Participation in the Conservation Reserve ProgramHung-Hao Chang and Richard N. Boisvert By distinguishing between the decision to participate in the conservation reserve program (CRP) and the decision for whole-farm vs. part-farm participation, we model participation as separate binary decisions. Our results suggest the farm characteristics and other factors affect the decision to participate in CRP differently than the decision regarding whole-farm vs. part-farm participation. This model formulation also helps to clarify the conditions under which the effect of CRP payments on the acreage enrolled in the program is positive or negative. (JEL Q15, Q18)

http://le.uwpress.org/cgi/content/abstract/85/1/144
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关键词:HKI Kim Conservation distinguish Formulation 论文 uwpress

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zhkim5858 发表于 2010-4-30 21:01:08
Adjacency Externalities and Forest Fire Prevention
Christian S L Crowley, Arun S Malik, Gregory S Amacher, Robert G Haight. Land Economics. Madison: Feb 2009. Vol. 85, Iss. 1; pg. 162
Abstract (Summary)
This paper models landowner behavior on timberland subject to damage by fire. We examine how management decisions by adjacent landowners yield outcomes that diverge from the social optimum, and consider how this divergence depends on landowner preferences and information. We conduct a numerical simulation in which landowners interact through the effects of their fire prevention activities on a common risk of fire. The results reveal significant social inefficiencies related to externalities associated with private fuel treatment decisions. We consider a policy for aligning social and private decisions by requiring landowners to share the government's cost of fire suppression. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

藤椅
zhkim5858 发表于 2010-4-30 21:56:27
今天运气好。

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