发帖
雷达卡
Edwin L. Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University
leim@mail.smu.edu
Jing Pan
Edwin L. Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University
jingp@mail.smu.edu
Stephen Stubben
David Eccles School of Business, University of Utah
steve.stubben@utah.edu
AR
ABSTRACT: This study documents the existence of local employment preferences for corporate
executives and examines how the compensation of executives’ local peers affects their own
performance, risk-taking decisions, and financial reporting decisions. We find that external hires
of new CEOs (CFOs) are five (eight) times more likely to be from local firms than non- local firms.
We also find that local tournament incentives—as proxied by the pay gap between an executive and
higher-paid executives in the area—are associated with stronger performance, greater risk taking,
and more financial misreporting. We find consistent results using a difference-in-differences
analysis that exploits plausibly exogenous variation in local tournament incentives caused by
the sudden death of a local CEO. Our findings are consi tent with
executives taking actions to compete for a promotion to a nearby firm with higher pay.
ma2020：The Effect of Local Tournament Incentives on Firms Performance,Risk-Taki.pdf
(1.73 MB, 需要: 5 个论坛币)
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