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基于不同视角，上市公司董事会成员主要包括独立董事、内部董事、控股股东委派的董事、非控股股东委派的董事等。我国上市公司股权相对集中。以第一大股东为例，我国上市公司中第一大股东的持股比例平均超过30%（远高于美国的10%）。早期国内学者在研究董事会有效性时关注更多的是前三类董事。必须指出，公有制经济主导下的中国资本市场，无论从上市公司数量还是从企业规模上看，国企均占据主导地位；而且党委领导下的国企中董事会成员的政治关联错综复杂。经济私有化特别是这一轮混改推进过程中，应该让非控股股东（其中包括非国有股东）在上市国企的董事会监管机制中扮演何种角色？非控股股东积极参与董事会运行的动机和后果是什么？诸如此类的重要问题近几年引起了学界的关注。

本文作者主要针对以上相关问题对文献进行了梳理和分析。这个工作很有意义。它让大家了解学界关于这个话题的研究现状，从而帮助大家思考未来的研究方向，同时也为政策制定者的决策提供理论参考。

研究发现

作者的发现主要如下：

01

国企董事会的治理效应主要受到国有股和市场激励两层特征的驱动。第一层特征从效果上加强了董事会的监管，而第二层特征让董事会倾向于解决两类代理人问题。

01

非控股股东所委派董事对解决国企中第一类代理人问题（即股东与公司管理层之间的利益冲突）和第二类代理人问题最具治理效应。

01

独立董事（特别是具有专业背景的独立董事）能有效地扮演解决两类代理人问题的角色。但是，在国企中，独立董事也可能没有足够的动机去行使监管职能，原因包括：在国企内部，控股股东太过强势、独立董事面临较低的风险，等等。

原文题目及摘要

Tracing back to the source: Understanding the corporate governance of boards of directors in Chinese SOEs

Zhengfei Lu, Jigao Zhu

Based on the relevant theories of corporate governance and the special institutional background of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this paper systematically reviews the literature on the independence and governance effect of SOE boards. We find that the governance effect of SOE boards is driven by the dual characteristics of SOEs: state involvement in ownership and market incentives. With the state involved in ownership, SOEs adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which results in an enhanced governance effect. Under market incentives, SOEs tend to have an optimal board structure that helps mitigate both the shareholder–management agency problem (Type I agency problem) and the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder agency problem (Type II agency problem). In terms of the governance effect of boards, directors appointed by non-controlling shareholders are effective in alleviating Type I and Type II agency problems, and this highlights the importance of mixed-ownership reforms in SOEs. Independent directors, especially those with a professional background, also play a role in improving corporate governance. However, independent directors in SOEs have relatively weak incentives to monitor, which limits their governance effect. This paper shows positive implications for promoting mixed-ownership reforms and improving board governance in SOEs.

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关键词：陆正飞 Professional Shareholders independence Implications