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This new text book by Urs Birchler and Monika Butler is an introduction to the study of how information affects economic relations. The authors provide a narrative treatment of the more formal concepts of Information Economics, using easy to understand and lively illustrations from film and literature and nutshell examples.
The book first covers the economics of information in a 'man versus nature' context, explaining basic concepts like rational updating or the value of information. Then in a 'man versus man' setting, Birchler and Butler describe strategic issues in the use of information: the make-buy-or-copy decision, the working and failure of markets and the important role of outguessing each other in a macroeconomic context. It closes with a 'man versus himself' perspective, focusing on information management within the individual.
Preface p. xxi
Why study information economics? p. 1
How to use this book p. 5
The purpose of the book p. 5
Ways of reading the book p. 6
The structure of the book p. 8
Using the book for teaching p. 8
Solutions to problem sets and other supporting material p. 9
Information as an economic good p. 11
What is information? p. 13
Introduction p. 13
Main ideas: The strangest good of all p. 14
Theory: Describing, comparing and updating information p. 17
Conclusions and further reading p. 26
Problem sets: Medical and financial testing p. 27
The value of information p. 31
Introduction p. 31
Main ideas: The source(s) of information value p. 32
Theory: Knowledge is power p. 37
Application: The resolution of uncertainty p. 50
Application: The informational cost of mediocrity p. 53
Conclusions and further reading p. 56
Problem sets: Precious advice p. 56
The optimal amount of information p. 61
Introduction p. 61
Main ideas: Is it worth the cost? p. 62
Theory: Deciding at the margin p. 63
Application: The central bank's inflation forecast p. 67
Application: Search p. 70
Conclusions and further reading p. 79
Problem sets: Paying, searching, and waiting for information p. 80
The production of information p. 83
Introduction p. 83
Main Ideas: Too little research or too much? p. 86
Theory: The incentive to innovate p. 88
Application: Creative destruction p. 97
Application: Rating agencies p. 105
Application: Why are banks supervised? p. 107
Conclusions and further reading p. 109
Problem sets: Produce or copy-sell or give away? p. 110
How the market aggregates information p. 115
From information to prices p. 117
Introduction p. 117
Main ideas: Revealing information through prices p. 118
Theory: The market as an information processor p. 121
Application: Terrorism futures and prediction markets p. 135
Application: Should bank supervisors look at market prices? p. 137
Conclusions and further reading p. 142
Problem sets: Two heads know more than one p. 143
Knowing facts or reading thoughts? p. 145
Introduction p. 145
Main ideas: Fundamental versus strategic uncertainty p. 146
Theory: Higher-order information p. 148
Application: Keynes in the lab p. 162
Application: Conformism and learning from debate p. 165
Application: Betrayals and mediation p. 167
Conclusions and further reading p. 169
Problem sets: The art of outguessing others p. 171
Coordination problems p. 173
Introduction p. 173
Main ideas: Red or white? p. 174
Theory: Coordination and multiple equilibria p. 180
Application: Bank runs p. 190
Conclusions and further reading p. 200
Problem sets: "Should I stay or should I go?" p. 201
Learning and cascades p. 203
Introduction p. 203
Main ideas: "Always stand at the longest queue" p. 205
Theory: Observational learning p. 207
Application: Learning in repeated games p. 221
Conclusions and further reading p. 224
Problem sets: A bath in the crowd p. 224
The macroeconomics of information p. 227
Introduction p. 227
Main ideas: Who acquires information and why? p. 228
Theory: Information is imperfect and costly p. 232
Application: Central bank transparency p. 245
Conclusions and further reading p. 248
Problem sets: As time goes by p. 249
Asymmetric information p. 253
The winner's curse p. 255
Introduction p. 255
Main ideas: How to lose by winning p. 257
Theory: The importance of conditional expectations p. 260
Application: The underpricing of IPOs p. 266
Application: Prices and the winner's curse p. 269
Conclusions and further reading p. 270
Problem sets: Cursing winners p. 271
Information and selection p. 273
Introduction p. 273
Main ideas: When information prevents trading p. 274
Theory: The market for lemons p. 277
Application: The insurance destruction effect p. 286
Application: Annuities p. 293
Conclusions and further reading p. 300
Problem sets: Buying the cat in a bag p. 302
Optimal contracts p. 305
Introduction p. 305
Main ideas: The economic lie detector p. 307
Theory: Optimal contracts p. 312
Application: Price-quality discrimination p. 322
Application: Subordinated debt p. 328
Conclusions and further reading p. 334
Problem sets: Deal or no deal? p. 335
The revelation principle p. 341
Introduction p. 341
Main ideas: Many lies, one truth p. 342
Theory: The relevation principle p. 343
Application: The debt contract p. 349
Application: Auctions p. 356
Application: Why Enron should not have happened p. 360
Conclusions and further reading p. 362
Problem sets: Know your value p. 364
Creating incentives p. 367
Introduction p. 367
Main ideas: Delegation and moral hazard p. 369
Theory: Incentive contracts p. 371
Application: Bank deposit insurance and risk taking p. 381
Application: Credence goods p. 389
Conclusions and further reading p. 395
Problem sets: Getting things done p. 397
The economics of self-knowledge p. 401
Me, Myself, and I p. 403
Introduction p. 403
Main ideas: Contracting with oneself p. 404
Theory: Intertemporal choice and self-management p. 411
Application: Soft paternalism p. 425
Conclusions and further reading p. 428
Problem sets: Tomorrow I will p. 430
Notes p. 433
Bibliography p. 439
Index p. 449
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