2010年4月西班牙银行业研究报告

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【出版时间及名称】：2010年4月西班牙银行业研究报告
        【作者】：德意志银行
        【文件格式】：pdf
        【页数】：36
        【目录或简介】：
Target price and recommendation changes
Driven by adjustments to our valuation assumptions and how we derive our target
price (now solely based on BV metrics) we increase our DDM-based target price
for Popular to E6.2, for Sabadell to E4.0, for Bankinter to E6.5, for Pastor to E4.6,
and finally reduce Banesto’s to E10.2. We maintain Banesto and Bankinter’s Hold
rating and upgrade Popular, Sabadell, and Pastor from Sell to Hold.
Deutsche Bank AG/London
All prices are those current at the end of the previous trading session unless otherwise indicated. Prices are sourced from local
exchanges via Reuters, Bloomberg and other vendors. Data is sourced from Deutsche Bank and subject companies. Deutsche
Bank does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. Thus, investors should be aware that the firm
may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single
factor in making their investment decision. DISCLOSURES AND ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS ARE LOCATED IN APPENDIX 1.
MICA(P) 106/05/2009
Recommendation Change
Companies featured
Banco Popular (POP.MC),EUR5.87 Hold
2009A 2010E 2011E
EPS Adjusted (EUR)0.49 0.39 0.49
P/E Adjusted (x) 10.6 15.2 11.9
P/B 0.9 1.0 0.9
Banco de Sabadell (SABE.MC),EUR4.22 Hold
2009A 2010E 2011E
EPS Adjusted (EUR)0.63 0.26 0.35
P/E Adjusted (x) 6.2 16.0 12.2
P/B 1.0 1.0 1.0
Banesto (BTO.MC),EUR8.46 Hold
2009A 2010E 2011E
EPS Adjusted (EUR)1.20 1.01 1.15
P/E Adjusted (x) 7.1 8.4 7.3
P/B 1.1 1.0 0.9
Bankinter (BKT.MC),EUR6.41 Hold
2009A 2010E 2011E
EPS Adjusted (EUR)0.61 0.38 0.63
P/E Adjusted (x) 11.8 16.7 10.2
P/B 1.3 1.1 1.1
Banco Pastor (PAS.MC),EUR4.49 Hold
2008A 2009E 2010E
EPS Adjusted (EUR)0.79 0.48 0.24
P/E Adjusted (x) 6.3 9.4 18.9
P/B 1.0 0.8 0.8
Global Markets Research Company
Reasons for our upgrades from Sell to Hold
In our Outlook report (18 Nov 2009), we cited the following reasons for
maintaining our Sell recommendations: (1) 2010 would most likely be the toughest
year for Spanish retail banking, (2) Spain’s challenging economic outlook relative to
European peers; and (3) more volatile, lower visibility and weaker than European
banks earnings/profitability performance that also places normalized earnings
further down the road. The previous arguments are still valid, which added to the
persistent sovereign risk to Spain (although slowly normalizing and sentiment-wise
decoupling from other peripherals) may represent short-term headwinds
preventing these names from outperforming (justifying not adopting a more
positive stance). Following an average 60% underperformance to the European
banks sector since January 2009, we believe that current valuation levels are
supportive, largely reflecting challenges and uncertainties and therefore, we do
not see sufficient downside potential to justify our Sell ratings any longer.
Base-case and stressed valuations supportive: limited downside potential…
On average they trade on 0.9x 2011E P/TE (Eurobanks: 1.2x P/TE), a multiple that
represents, in some names, the largest historical discount to the sector. Whilst as
a result of lower expected normalized RoE relative to historical levels and a
structurally higher CoE, we cannot justify Spanish banks trading at historical P/BV
valuations levels, we regard the fact that these names are earning less than cost
of equity, as cyclical, rather than structural and we believe that 2009 BV levels can
be considered, in a stressed situation (see page 5), as sustainable. Thus, we
regard their avg 1x 2009 P/BV as supportive and the downside potential limited.
…but timing in the current context is still relevant
Whereas on normalized earnings, these names trade at undemanding valuations,
shorter-term metrics (2010/11 P/E) indicate otherwise. Moreover, we believe the
market is unlikely to value them on a normalized earnings basis and therefore
would not expect these stocks to outperform in the coming months provided that:
(1) other European banks manage to deliver stronger-than-Spain earnings growth
and improving profitability; (2) the Spanish economy does not produce some solid
recovery indicators; (3) the uncertainties around how severely the economic
downturn will affect the banking sector’s earnings continue; and (4) valuations (in
absolute or relative terms) become sufficiently attractive to bear the risks.
Valuation and risks to our cautious stance
The main risks relate to developments and newsflow regarding the Spanish
economy. We derive our target prices from a single-stage P/Tangible Equity
multiple model (see pgs 21-22 for details). This report changes ratings and/or
target prices for several companies under coverage. For a detailed listing of
these changes, see Figure 1.

Table of Contents
Challenges persist, but are priced in; Hold ..................................... 3
Reasons for our upgrades from Sell to Hold.............................................................................3
Base-case valuation is undemanding and worst-case valuation supportive, thus limiting
downside potential…................................................................................................................3
However, timing in the current context is still relevant, thus justifying a more upbeat stance is
also challenging ........................................................................................................................7
Adjusting target prices..............................................................................................................8
Still prefer large international retail banks Santander and BBVA ...............................................9
Spain’s macro is challenging but manageable ............................. 11
Spain on the right, painful path ...............................................................................................11
2010 to be the toughest year for Spanish retail banks ................ 12
Summary of views on Spanish banking ..................................................................................12
Banking activity – pressure on NII the main drag to earnings .................................................12
Credit quality: deterioration will continue; its intensity will depend on economic activity,
unemployment, and ECB rates ...............................................................................................12
Loan-loss-related cost of risk to remain high and provisions for real estate assets demanding
...............................................................................................................................................14
2010-2011 forecasts ...............................................................................................................14
Running the numbers: Credit quality and provisions .................. 16
Understatement of credit quality metrics................................................................................16
Differentiating between provisions on loans in arrears and on assets purchased ..................17
Q1 results season is around the corner ......................................... 18
Valuation methods and risks.......................................................... 22
Company risks ........................................................................................................................22
Valuation methodology ...........................................................................................................23
Running the numbers pages........................................................... 24

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关键词：行业研究报告 研究报告 行业研究 西班牙 银行业 研究报告 西班牙 银行业

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