经济Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms

Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms

文献名称	Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms
文献作者	Elinor Ostrom
作者所在单位	Indiana University
文献分类	已发表文献
学科一级分类	经济
学科二级分类	新制度经济学
文献摘要	I assume multiple types of players--"rational egoists," as well as "conditional cooperators" and "willing punishers"--in models of nonmarket behavior. I use an indirect evolutionary approach to explain how multiple types of players could survive and flourish in social dilemma situations. Contextual variables that enhance knowledge about past behavior assist in explaining the origin of collective action. Among the important contextual variables are types of goods, types of groups, and rules that groups use to provide and allocate goods. Finally, I reexamine a series of design principles that were derived earlier from an examination of extensive case materials.
参考文献
关键字	Collective Actio，
发表所在刊物（或来源）	Journal of Economic Perspectives，Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer, 2000), pp. 137-158
发表时间	2000-06-01
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Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms