经济An axiomatization of minimal curb sets

An axiomatization of minimal curb sets

文献名称	An axiomatization of minimal curb sets
文献作者	Mark Voorneveld, Willemien Kets
作者所在单位	Stockholm School
文献分类	已发表文献
学科一级分类	经济
学科二级分类	博弈论
文献摘要	Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; they are axiomatized in this article.
参考文献
关键字	game theory
发表所在刊物（或来源）	International Journal of Game Theory， Volume 33, Number 2005 , 479-490,
发表时间	2005-10-01
适用研究领域
评论
上传时间	2011-1-20 11:40
下载文献	consistency.pdf[167.61 KB] 注：下载文献会消耗您一个“当日剩余下载次数”
会员评论
发表评论

An axiomatization of minimal curb sets