Optimal Taxation and Public Production: I--Production Efficiency |
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文献名称 | Optimal Taxation and Public Production: I--Production Efficiency | ||||||
文献作者 | Peter A. Diamond,and James A. Mirrlees | ||||||
作者所在单位 | University of Cambridge | ||||||
文献分类 | 已发表文献 | ||||||
学科一级分类 | 经济 | ||||||
学科二级分类 | 劳动经济学 | ||||||
文献摘要 |
Two kinds of models for a productive organization are presented. In the first, both production and rewards are based on the performance of individuals, which is perfectly observed. Their abilities are not observable. Despite this, theorems are proved giving strong grounds for the equality of wages and marginal products unless there is monopsony in the labor market. This latter case is also discussed. The second model, which focuses on the imperfect observation of performance, allows interesting deductions about optimal payment schedules and organizational structure. |
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参考文献 | |||||||
关键字 | Optimal Taxation,Public Production,Production Efficiency | ||||||
发表所在刊物(或来源) | American Economic Review, 1971, vol. 61, issue 1, pages 8-27 | ||||||
发表时间 | 1971-01-01 | ||||||
适用研究领域 | |||||||
评论 | |||||||
上传时间 | 2011-1-20 16:56 | ||||||
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Diamond-Mirrlees_2_(AER_71).pdf[2.9 MB]
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