A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts |
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文献名称 | A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts | ||||||
文献作者 | Green, Jerry R.Nancy L. Stokey | ||||||
作者所在单位 | Harvard University | ||||||
文献分类 | 已发表文献 | ||||||
学科一级分类 | 经济 | ||||||
学科二级分类 | 金融学 | ||||||
文献摘要 | Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The principal observes only the output levels of the agents. It is shown that in the absence of a common shock, using optimal independent contracts dominates using the optimal tournament. Conversely, if the distribution of the common shock is sufficiently diffuse, using the optimal tournament dominates using optimal independent contracts. Finally, it is shown that for a sufficiently large number of agents, a principal who cannot observe the common shock but uses the optimal tournament, does as well as one who can observe the shock and uses independent contracts. | ||||||
参考文献 | |||||||
关键字 | Tournaments,Contracts | ||||||
发表所在刊物(或来源) | Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, Vo. 3, (June 1983), pp. 349- 364. | ||||||
发表时间 | 1983-06-01 | ||||||
适用研究领域 | 一般均衡 | ||||||
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上传时间 | 2011-1-20 17:15 | ||||||
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GreenStokey1983.pdf[1.16 MB]
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戚飞虹 |
戚飞虹发表于:2012-2-25 20:25 精彩 |
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