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Efficient Auctions

文献名称	Efficient Auctions
文献作者	Partha Dasgupta， Eric Maskin
作者所在单位	University of Cambridge，Harvard University
文献分类	已发表文献
学科一级分类	经济
学科二级分类	新制度经济学
文献摘要	We exhibit an efficient auction (an auction that maximizes surplus conditional on all available information). For private values, the Vickrey auction (for one good) or its Groves-Clarke extension (for multiple goods) is efficient. We show that the Vickrey and Groves-Clarke auctions can be generalized to attain efficiency when there are common values, if each buyer's information can be represented as a one-dimensional signal. When a buyer's information is multidimensional, no auction is generally efficient. Nevertheless, in a broad class of cases, our auction is constrained-efficient in the sense of being efficient subject to incentive constraints. © 2000 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
参考文献
关键字	Auctions
发表所在刊物（或来源）	Quarterly Journal of Economics，May 2000, Vol. 115, No. 2, Pages 341-388
发表时间	2000-05-01
适用研究领域	合约理论
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上传时间	2011-1-21 14:23
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